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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades the United States and the Soviet
Union have been constructing and improving ballistic missile
submarines and their weapons systems in support of evolving
military and political nuclear strategies. There are advantages
in basing strategic missiles in submarines which are enabled
by the platforms' mobility and stealth. Improvement in tech-
nology have afforded more flexibility in operations and war
and peace-time assignments.
The doctrine which governs the employment of strategic
systems should reflect national security priorities, external
military threats and the capabilities of one's own forces.
In the case of ballistic missile submarines, both the United
States and the Soviet Union have developed and altered strategic
plans to incorporate the advantages afforded by undersea
destructive potential. Those plans include statements of
peace-time employment for deterrence of the enemy and targeting
assignments for fighting a war.
A comparison of U.S. and Soviet submarine ballistic missile
systems development, and accompanying public doctrine of
purpose and planned utilization in peace and war-time, provide
the basis for an assessment of the effectiveness of current
and proposed weapons systems in their contribution to national
security.

Sections II and III outline the development of the sub-
marines and submarine ballistic missiles of the United States
and Soviet Union respectively. Section IV presents oper-
ational considerations which affect weapons system employment
such as personnel basing and support, patrols and communications
Sections V and VI trace the history of U.S. and Soviet stra-
tegic doctrine, particularly those elements which govern
employment of ballistic missile submarines. Section VII looks
at the future of SSBNs as determined by technology and
international politics and VIII summarizes the research on a
comparative United States vs. Soviet Union basis.
Delineation of the meaning of the following abbreviations
facilitates the presentation of the material:
SSBN: Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
SSB: Conventionally-powered (diesel) ballistic missile
submarine
SLBM: Submarine- launched ballistic missile
FBM: "Fleet ballistic missile," often used to refer
collectively to the submarine and missile systems.

II. SSBN AND SLBM DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
A. INITIAL PROGRAM
The United States commissioned the world's first nuclear
powered submarine, U.S.S. Nautilus, in September 19 54. In
November of the following year the Secretary of Defense
launched the Navy on a joint program with the Army of ballistic
missile development. Designated IRBM #2 (IRBM: intermediate
range ballistic missile), the project's dual objectives were
to achieve an initial sea-based ballistic missile capability
with the Jupiter missile and to provide a competitive alter-
native to the Air Force program, IRBM #1. [Ref. 1: pp. 22-23]
Considerable opposition to the project arose within the
Navy for two reasons. Previous interservice rivalry with the
Air Force over mission responsibilities had led to the poli-
tically motivated scrapping of a new 'super' aircraft carrier
in 1949. Second, the opportunity costs in terms of more
conventional weapons systems raised doubts about the value of
the new concept. [Ref. 2: p. 42] However, Admiral Arleigh
Burke, then Chief of Naval Operations, disagreed with the
program's detractors and heartily supported continuance of
research.
The combined Army-Navy venture was tasked with exploring
the land and sea potentials of the Jupiter IRBM. To manage
his service's portion of the project, the Secretary of the

Navy created a new agency, the Special Projects Office, and
named Vice Admiral William F. Raborn as its first director.
[Ref. 1: p. 23] From the outset, Raborn's work was pressed
by a sense of urgency because of Soviet advances in hydrogen
bomb and ICBM technology. [Ref. 2: p. 41]
Jupiter was a cumbersome and heavy 60 foot missile. Its
engine was inherently troublesome because of volatility of
the liquid fuel, complexity of preparation for launch and
maintenance problems. Considering these characteristics
unsuitable for sea-basing, the Navy began alternate development
of "Jupiter S," a pared down 44 foot hybrid of the original
with solid fuel engines. However, size remained a problem.
The "S" weighed 80 tons and was estimated to require an 8,500
ton submarine to carry a pay load of four missiles. [Ref. 1:
pp. 26-27] After two years of unsatisfactory work, the joint
project with the Army was scrapped.
By the summer of 1956, Admirals Burke and Raborn supported
development of an entirely new solid fuel ballistic missile.
Planned specifications for the weapon included a weight of
eight to fifteen tons, a low yield nuclear warhead and a range
of 1,000 to 1,500 miles. New concepts in submarine design
and technology were concurrently explored to launch the missile
Both aspects of the system, missile and submarine, came under
the aegis of the Special Projects Office and were collectively
named the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Program. [Ref. 1:
pp. 1,2,30-31]

The development of the first operational ballistic missile
submarine was a huge venture, employing 30,000 contractors
and government agency personnel. Among the participants were
Lockheed Aircraft, the missile system manager; Aerojet-General
Corporation, which produced the solid propellant; Dr. C. I.
Draper of M.I.T., who developed the inertial guidance system
for the missile; the Atomic Energy Commission, which built
the warhead; and Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover of the Nuclear
Power Directorate, who was responsible for the submarine power
plant. [Ref. 1: pp. 11, 80-81, 91] To coordinate their
efforts, the Special Projects Office utilized P.E.R.T. (Pro-
gram Evaluation and Review Technique), a revolutionary
computerized management program which analyzed problems and
identified potential trouble areas. [Ref. 3: p. 174]
The FBM Program was and is considered a great success
attributable to American science and industry. The missile
systems, called Polaris, deployed several years ahead of the
original schedule and with no cost overruns. [Ref. 1: p. 11]
Fulfillment of the single mission requirement, sea-based
deterrent missile forces, tied numerous technologies together
and at the peak of production in 1964, twelve submarines
were commissioned in one year.
B. POLARIS MISSILE: THE FIRST U.S. SLBM
Polaris is designated an IRBM with a range of less than
3,000 miles. Missiles with greater ranges warrant designation
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as ICBM's or intercontinental ballistic missiles. The missile
expends essentially all of its energy in the early boost
phase, has an inertial guidance system and reaches speeds in
excess of 15,000 miles per hour. The original concept of
submerged launch called for compressed gas to push the missile
to the surface where its rocket motors would ignite. The
method was later modified to a steam ejector system in which a
small rocket motor burns, pouring extreirely hot gases into
a water-filled chamber. Instantaneously produced steam then
ejects the missile from the launcher. [Ref. 4, 1966-6 7:
p. 338]
Three versions of the Polaris missile were built by
Lockheed's Aerospace Division, designated A-l, A-2 and A-3.
A-l was an interim weapon, rapidly designed and tested to
keep pace with accelerated weapon system deployment schedules.
An A-l was first test fired from a submerged submarine in
July I960. 1
Two years later, production of the A-2 achieved originally
planned specifications, particularly in required range. (See
Table I)
A-3 incorporated advances in technology learned from its
predecessors. [Ref. 1, pp. 10, 11] Project Antelope, com-
pleted in 1966, improved the latest Polaris version's
capabilities in defense penetration and engine performance.
In 19 78, the Department of Energy disclosed that
mechanical defects had rendered three-fourths of the A-l's
warheads inoperative. [Ref. 5]
11

Increased penetration was achieved through the MRV (multiple
re-entry vehicles) concept. Three separate warheads could
be launched from a single A-3's final 'bus 1 stage. The war-
heads would re-enter the earth's atmosphere in a shotgun
pattern with the intended target at the center. Although not
independently targeted, as in MIRVed missiles, the multipli-
cation of warheads served to complicate the problem posed by
the Polaris for anti-ballistic missile defenses. [Ref. 6:
p. 17]
C. THE FIRST SSBN's: GEORGE WASHINGTON AND ETHAN ALLEN
CLASSES
Naval construction programs of Fiscal Year 19 5 8 authorized
the start of new submarines to launch the Polaris missile.
The first boats, the George Washington class SSBN, evolved
from a modified Skipjack SSN design. To provide for sixteen
launch tubes in two rows of eight, 130 feet were added to
the hull of the original 251 foot submarine. New fire con-
trol and missile support systems completed the modifications.
In all, five submarines of this class were built between
1959 and 1961. The George Washington class SSBNs first put
to sea armed with A-l or A-2 missiles, but subsequently con-
verted to the A-3 during refit periods. [Ref. 4, 1964-65: p. 370]
The Ethan Allen class SSBNs were the first to be
specifically and originally designed to carry ballistic
missiles. Five Allen class boats were built between 1961
and 196 3 and were equipped with the A-2 and later, the A-3
12

Polaris missile. Although deeper diving than her predecessors,
the Ethan Allen brought no breakthroughs in new naval
strategic capabilities.
D. LAFAYETTE/FRANKLIN CLASS SSBN
While construction of the Allen class submarines was
ongoing, new designs and funds authorized a third and fourth
class of U.S. SSBNs. Between 196 3 and 196 7 the Navy launched
nineteen Lafayette and twelve Benjamin Franklin class sub-
marines. The two classes are very similar in appearance,
equipment and capabilities. The Franklin boats incorporate
minor modifications such as quieter machinery.
The first eight submarines of the Lafayette/Franklin
class were fitted with the A-2 missile and the rest with the
MRV A-3. By 1966, with the completion of the last of this
class, the U.S. Navy manned forty-one deterrent submarines
with 656 missiles. [Ref. 7: pp. 20-21]
E. POSEIDON
New concepts in ballistic missile technology were intro-
duced in the mid-1960s. Multiple Independently Targeted
Re-entry Vehicles, or MIRV's, when launched from a single
missile's bus stage, could saturate any planned Soviet anti-
ballistic missile systems. Shortly after burn-out of the
propulsion stages, the bus would be pointed at a target,
release a warhead, and then redirect to another target and
fire until all warheads were expended. If a single target
13

were the objective, warheads could approach at widely spaced
intervals and on different trajectories. [Ref. 6: p. 22]
MIRV technology, coupled with other advances in guidance,
made possible the potential to destroy hard targets such as
bunkers and missile silos as well as soft targets such as
cities and airfields.
The SLBM which incorporated these advances was built by
Lockheed and designated Poseidon C-3 in January, 1965. [Ref,
1: p. 220] Poseidon is about twice as heavy as the Polaris
A-3 but can carry four times the payload. Some of the ten
to fourteen warheads carried on a single bus stage can be
traded off for increased range or anti-ballistic missile
penetration aids. The currently reported C.E.P. (circular
error probability) of the warhead is about 1,500 feet, not
accurate enough for hardened targets according to the Depart-
ment of Defense. [Ref. 6: p. 22] The Improved Accuracy
Program was initiated to decrease the C.E.P. to 1,000 feet
by the early 1980 f s. [Ref. 3: p. 114]
Between 19 70 and 19 74 the thirty-one Lafayette and
Franklin class SSBNs were converted to fire Poseidon. The
George Washington and Ethan Allen were not modified because
of their age and prohibitive cost of modification. Navy
yards fitted the boats with the Poseidon during normal over-
haul along with replacement of nuclear cores. The missile
tubes were enlarged, the fire control system replaced, and
a new satellite communications tranceiver was installed.
14

[Ref. 6: p. 22] In 19 75, Secretary of Defense, James R.
Schlesinger noted that with the completion of the Poseidon
program, the FBM arm of the nuclear triad, the least vulner-
able of American strategic forces, accounted for 30% of the
total 2,150 launch vehicles and 55% of the 9,000 separate
warheads or re-entry vehicles. [Ref. 9, 1975-76: p. 404]
F. TRIDENT SYSTEMS
As early as 196 7, new concepts and technologies were
developing for the sea-based deterrence force of the 19 80's.
Collectively called ULMS (Underwater Launched Missile System)
,
the research projects included an 8,000 ton, 450 foot SSBN
designed by Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics to
take advantage of advances in noise reduction, crew habita-
bility, communications, modular construction and maintenance
techniques. The new submarine was designed to carry a longer
range and more accurate missile than Poseidon.
ULMS was initiated to confront projected Soviet advances
in anti-submarine warfare. In 1969, Secretary of Defense
Melvin Laird felt that a determined effort by Moscow in ASW
would render current SSBN's too vulnerable. [Ref. 4, 1969-
70: p. 26] However, detractors noted that the Soviets were
not, in fact, making much progress in anti-submarine warfare
and, therefore, there was no need for improved sea-based
deterrence. [Ref. 6: p. 26] Low budgeting in fiscal years




By 19 72, a continuing Soviet build-up in strategic
offensive forces caused new interest in the program, now
named "Trident." To accelerate progress, the project managers
divided their efforts into two phases. Initially, a new
long range improved missile was to be developed for deploy-
ment with Lafayette/Franklin class submarines in the late
1970 's. A new submarine, to fire an even more capable missile
was planned for deployment in the 1980's. [Ref. 4, 1972-73:
p. 409]
The first Trident missile, designated C-4, has a C.E.P.
similar to Poseidon at a greater range. (See Table I) How-
ever, a flight path equal to Poseidon's maximum range yields
greater accuracy, less than 1,000 feet C.E.P. In flight,
the .missile uses a stellar sensor, taking star sights
immediately after launch and during the post boost phase to
correct its course. [Ref. 8: p. 114; Ref. 10]
Conversions of Poseidon boats to Trident C-4 began in
19 79 and will be completed on the twelve newest Lafayette/
Franklin SSBN's by about 19 83. Required modifications in-
clude minor alterations of the launchers and ballasting
because of increased missile weight, and extensive changes
in the fire control and missile support systems. The first
operational Trident patrol was in December, 19 79. [Ref. 11,
1979-80: p. 655, 1981-82: p. 618]
16

G. OHIO CLASS SSBN
U.S.S. Ohio (SSBN 726), the lead submarine of the new
Trident weapon system, was laid down in April, 19 76 by Elec-
tric Boat Division. Design and construction problems delayed
expected launch and commissioning dates several times.
[Ref. 11, 1981-82: p. 617] Support of the program has waxed
and waned frequently because of its great monetary and
opportunity costs. Ongoing strategic arras limitation or
reduction talks may impact on eventual force levels. President
Reagan has announced a planned procurement rate of one sub-
marine per year for a current total funding request of
twelve boats. [Ref. 12: p. 5] U.S.S. Ohio was commissioned
November 11, 19 81, and arrived at Bremerton, Washington in August
19 82 to prepare for its first operational patrol.
H. COMPARISONS AND ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Table I depicts the development of United States SLBM's.
Each successive missile that has become operational has
increased in size and capabilities. The A-l which served
as an interim weapon retired from service in October 1965.
The A-2 and A-3 versions of Polaris brought improved range,
accuracy and MRV technology to the fleet and were in the
active fleet until 19 81.
The Poseidon C-3 halved previous SLBM accuracy as
measured by C.E.P. and introduced MIRV capability to the FBM
force. The missile will continue to deploy aboard Lafayette/
Franklin class SSBN's into the 1990' s.
17

The Trident I C-4 achieves the greatest accuracy of any
operational SLBM through incorporation of stellar guidance
corrections to the inertial system. Increased range is
attributed partially to an •" aerospike * which deploys from
the missile's nose on launch to reduce aerodynamic drag.
[Ref. 13: p. 17] First deployed in 1979, the C-4 will
eventually be fitted out in twelve Lafayette/Franklin class
SSBN's. It will also deploy with the Ohio class boats until
the follow-on D-5 missile is completed in the late 1980 's.
Table II traces U.S. SSBN development over the past
twenty-five years. Until the commissioning of U.S.S. Ohio,
all of the submarines were similar in size and capabilities.
Jane's Fighting Ships has noted the homogeneity of the
American SSBN force with thirty-one of the forty-one total
SSBN's of the closely related Lafayette and Franklin classes.
[Ref. 4, 196 4-65: p. vi] The Ohio, however, represents a
significant increase in size and capability, equipped with
twenty-four vice sixteen missile launchers as well as advanced
electronic and computer support systems.
All U.S. SSBN's are nuclear powered with a geared re-
duction system driving a single shaft. Additionally, they
are equipped with passive sonars including towed arrays and
either two or three Ship's Inertial Navigation Systems (SINS),
which allow accurate internal submarine navigation. With
SINS, position information can be crossed-checked by optical-
stellar, electronic and satellite means. In addition to
18

providing submarine navigation information, the equipment's
data is fed to the missiles' guidance systems for position
update until the instant of firing. [Ref. 4, 1971-72: p.
408]
Table III summarizes the total deterrent submarine assets
available to United States leaders over the years. The 1960 's
experienced a rapid build-up of the Polaris force which
resulted in block obsolescence of ten boats between 19 79 and
19 81. The Washington and Allen class submarines have been
removed from the deterrence force, scheduled for conversion
to SSNs and eventual dismantling when their nuclear cores
are spent. [Ref. 11, 1981-82: p. 264]
As each Ohio class boat enters the fleet, it brings
twenty-four Trident I missiles to the fleet. Eventual force
levels will offset retirement of Lafayette and Franklin
class submarines in the 19 90s. Those boats, however, will
continue to deploy with Poseidon and Trident I missiles for
the next decade.
Although total submarines remained constant at 41 from
1967 until 1981, capabilities increased geometrically with
the introduction of the MIRVed Poseidon missile. Concurrently,
missile ranges constantly improved, expanding the operating
area and the reach into Soviet territory of the SSBN force.
The continuities of the U.S. FBM program have strengthened
its effectiveness in the nuclear triad. Consistently nuclear
powered, the submarines have remained the state of the art
19

in stealth and on-station sustainability. The ability to
construct and convert compatible submarines and missiles over
the years have allowed gradual but steady and less costly
improvements in weapon system capabilities and their rapid
introduction into the fleet. Consequently, over the past
twenty-two years, U.S. presidents have consistently relied
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III. SSB, SSBN AND SLBM DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION
A. EARLY CONCEPTS
A lack of Soviet interest in nuclear powered submarines
in the immediate post-World War II period is attributed by
Norman Polmar to Joseph Stalin's personal disinterest in
the concept. [Ref. 14: p. 31] Although research was under-
way on naval nuclear power plants in the late 1940s, Stalin
felt that traditional elements of military mass and battle-
field determination rather than new technology would triumph
over the West. His defense programs are a reflection of this
conservative view. In the years before Stalin died in March
195 3, a huge fleet was planned, including the construction
of 1,200 diesel submarines.
Following a brief period during which he consolidated
power, Nikita Khrushchev reversed many of Stalin's policies,
including those governing the military and national defense.
Emphasis for the navy, or VOENNO-MORSKOI FLOT (VMF) , shifted
from large costly traditional ships to destroyer-size units,
naval aircraft and submarines, all to be equipped with the
new missile technologies. In 1955, Khrushchev fired Admiral
N. G. Kuznetsov, the conservative chief of the VMF, replacing
him with 45-year-old S. G. Gorshkov, a naval officer with a
reputation for innovation and imagination. Both Khruschev
and Gorshkov envisioned a 'revolution' in militarv affairs
24

through the advent of nuclear technology and missile weapon
systems. [Ref. 14: pp. 32-34]
In the 1950' s, the mission of strategic strike fell upon
the Navy at a time when a submarine torpedo was the only
means available to bring atomic weapons to bear on the
continental United States. By 19 55, to replace this meager
offensive capability, top priority was assigned to the
development of submarine launched ballistic missiles. [Ref.
15: p. 148] Admiral Gorshkov would later reflect on early
Soviet experiments in the new concept, and the parallel lack
of success that the United States Navy encountered with the
Jupiter IRBM. He understood the requirement for 'revolutionary*
systems
:
The need for the rigid limitation of the mass-dimensional
characteristics of missiles for submarines demanded the
creation of special sea ballistic missiles. [Ref. 16:
p. 193]
To conduct tests and sea trials for experimentation in
SLBMs , the VMF lengthened and heightened the sail of a "Zulu"
class diesel-powered attack submarine (SS) and added two
vertical launch tubes. In September 1955, the boat first
launched a Soviet ballistic missile while surfaced, and by
1961, six of the Zulus, now designated Zulu-V, had been con-
verted to SSBs at the Zhdanov Shipyard in Leningrad.
[Ref. 17: p. 150]
25

B. DUAL CONVENTIONAL/NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT
The Severodvinsk Shipyard on the White Sea laid the keel
of the first Soviet nuclear submarine in early 19 56 and the
initial "November" class SSN was launched in 1958. Two years
later the same yard launched the VMF's first SSBN, the "Hotel"
class. This single shaft submarine was designed with three
missile tubes arranged in a large sail.
The first generation nuclear plant installed in Hotel
experienced extensive difficulties in safety and efficiency.
These problems combined with overriding strategic policy
considerations caused the limited construction of only ten
submarines of this class between 1958 and 1962. Concurrent
with SSBN production, as a hedge against failure of the new
atomic technology, the Soviet Union developed the diesel
powered "Golf" SSB. Somewhat smaller than Hotel, the Golf
class SSB was similarly designed to carry three ballistic
missiles in the sail. Powered by three engines, the Golf
became operational in 195 8, and by 196 3, twenty-two of the
class were on patrol or fitting out. [Ref. 4, 1963-64: p. 424]
C. FIRST OPERATIONAL MISSILES
The missile which first deployed with the Golf and Hotel
submarines was the SS-N-4 SARK (NATO designation) . Requiring
a surface launch, the liquid fuel SARK was a short range
missile with a powerful one megaton nuclear warhead. It had
been test-fired from the Zulu-V in 19 55 but did not deploy
operationally until 1958. [Ref. 17: p. 57]
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Five years later, the VMF introduced the SS-N-5 SERB to
the fleet, incorporating the significant improvement over its
predecessor of submerged launch. SERB also doubled the range
for Soviet SLBMs with a comparable pay load. In all, seven
Hotel and thirteen Golf boats were converted to launch the
SS-N-5. Western analysts noted the conversions by designating
SS-N-5 equipped subs as Golf II and Hotel II and SS-N-4 subs
as Golf I and Hotel I.
D. FIRST TRUE STRATEGIC SSBN
It is highly likely that the Soviet Union had initiated
a program for a new SSBN to be similar in appearance to the
U.S. Ethan Allen class by 1957. [Ref. 11, 1981-82: p. 477]
However, in January 196 0, the Kremlin enunciated a new defense
policy, shifting the majority of responsibility for strategic
strike to the land-based Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) . The
shift caused a slow-down in new submarine programs and con-
tributed to the limited number of Hotel class SSBN's built.
By the fall of 1961, the Soviets were able to discern
that the Kennedy administration had embarked on a major
across-the-board arms build-up, including accelerated SSBN
procurement. In October of that year, the Twenty-second
Communist Party Congress announced that it would respond in
kind. [Ref. 14: pp. 34-35]
Early in the decade the shipyards at Severodvinsk and
Komsomolsk in western Siberia were upgraded to build the new
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"Yankee" class SSBN. Together, the yards could accommodate
twelve hulls of the sixteen tube submarine and, when first
reported in open sources in 1969, the Soviet Union was
producing six to eight Yankees per year. With an end force
level of 34, the new SSBN provided the Soviet Union with a
true strategic strike system within operating range of the
continental United States.
E. YANKEE MISSILES
The missile designed to be fired from the Yankee was the
SS-N-6 Sawfly, a liquid fuel weapon with a range of about
1,300 nautical miles and submerged launch capability. In
1974 it was noted that modified Sawfly' s had joined the
fleet, including the 1,600 nautical mile Mark III with a
three MRV warhead.
In 19 77, the first Soviet solid fuel SLBM, the SS-N-17
was fitted out in a single Yankee (designated Yankee II)
,
extending the operational range of that one platform by 80
nautical miles. [Ref. 11, 1980-81: p. 472]
The ranges of the Sawfly missiles in the other 33 boats
necessitated long transits to reach patrol stations near the
eastern and western seaboards of the United States.
F. DELTA
In 19 72 the Soviets revealed a new SSBN class, designated
"Delta" by NATO. Although only slightly larger in tonnage
than Yankee, the new submarine provided a huge increase in
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capability for the Soviet Union because of its missile's 4800
mile range. To accommodate the large missile , Delta presents
an unusually high above—keel profile to house a pared down
complement of twelve launchers. [Ref. 11 , 19 78-79: p. 4 87]
The SS-N-8 missile aboard Delta was further improved in
1976, extending its range to 5600 nautical miles and increasing
its accuracy. An inertial quidance system with stellar
correction capability achieved a warhead C.E.P. under 1,500
feet, giving Delta unprecedented accuracy and range, thus
able to target all of the North American continent from home
waters. [Ref. 8: p. 115]
G. IMPROVED DELTAS
In 1971, while Delta was still in production, the Soviets
initiated a hybrid Delta II program. Increasing hull length
by about 50 feet, the Delta II accommodates sixteen SS-N-8
missiles. Six years later, a second version of the same
basic submarine became operational, the Delta III. About
2000 tons heavier than the Delta II, the latest series carries
sixteen of the new SS-N-18 SLBM's.
The SS-N-18 is a two-stage, liquid fuel missile with three
possible warheads. A single weapon version has been observed
as well as post boost vehicles with three or seven MIRV's.
Its improved accuracy and multiple warhead feature makes




Between 196 7 and 19 79, Soviet shipyards completed 66
Yankee and Delta SSBN's, convincingly closing the gap in
SLBM numbers with the United States. [Ref. 19: p. 8] Delta
Ills continue to be built today together with a new SSBN class.
H. TYPHOON
In 19 79 a new design for Soviet SSBNs was revealed.
Called "TAYFUN" (Typhoon) by the Kremlin, the submarine is
the largest undersea craft in the world with a dived dis-
placement of about 30,000 tons. First launched in September
19 80 at the Severodvinsk Shipyard, Typhoon has twenty missile
tubes forward of the sail, allowing space aft for two nuclear
reactors.
Other characteristics of Typhoon provide evidence of
revolutionary Soviet concepts in SSBN construction. A
separation of thirteen to fifteen feet between the inner and
outer hull enables resistance to torpedo hits. [Ref. 11,
19 81-82: p. 131] The gap between hulls may have another
purpose. Typhoon's hull rises high above the waterline when
surfaced. Its sail has a stubby profile and the bow diving
planes are retractable. These features, as well as the
inner-outer hull cushion, could contribute to a submarine's
ability to break through an ice pack and clear the missile
deck of ice chunks to fire its missiles. If this is the
purpose of Typhoon's unusual construction, SSBN's of its
class could patrol under the Arctic ice cap, reducing
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considerably the range to targets in North America over
previous patrol areas. [Ref. 20: pp. 8-9]
In early 1980, a new solid fuel SLBM was tested. Longer
than the SS-N-18, the missile, designated SS-NX-20, is pre-
sumed to be earmarked for Typhoon. It will probably incorp-
orate MIRV technology and have a maximum range similar to
SS-N-18. [Ref. 11, 1981-82: p. 762]
I. COMPARISONS AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Table IV summarizes Soviet SLBM development. Only mis-
siles which have reached the operational stage have been
included. Generally, the missiles have consistently improved
in accuracy and have extremely destructive warheads of one
megaton or more. The Soviets appear to prefer liquid fuel
engines for their SLBMs , which are generally more hazardous
to maintain and operate than their solid fuel counterparts.
Technological improvements of multiple and multiple
independently targeted warheads are now part of Soviet SLBM
development.
The SS-N-6 , along with the Yankee platform, gave the
Soviets their first real intercontinental undersea nuclear
threat. The SS-N-8 enabled North American targeting from
protected home waters. The SS-N-18 MIRV warheads are an
important developmental stage for attainment of a counterforce
capability.
Table V lists the myriad classes of Soviet SSB's, SSBN's
and hybrids. Although the pace of construction has sometimes
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been furious, qualitative progress in their submarines has
been gradual. Typhoon may represent a true departure from
submarine concepts as evidenced by its size and unusual
design.
Power plants, dimensions, displacement tonnage and
numbers of missiles have generally increased with introduction
of each new submarine. Some consistencies in Soviet SSBNs
include Snoop series search and navigation radars, either
Snoop Plate or Snoop Tray; ELF/VLF transceiver communications
gear with floating aerials; and bow array sonars.
Table VI lists the SLBM assets available to Soviet planners
over the years. From the crude and extremely limited force
capability in 1958, the Soviets underwent a huge build-up
in the 19 60s and 19 70s. They relied upon large yield and
throw weight for single warhead missiles rather than fewer
platforms and more numerous smaller warheads as in the United
States.
The SALT I accords signed in 19 72 allowed the Soviets to
continue rapid construction of SSBNs to reach the 6 2 sub-
marine, 9 50 launcher limits. Although not counted in those
restrictions, the boats armed with older missiles still provide
the Soviets with short range theater capability.
The six Zulu V submarines were removed from operation
between 1970 and 1977. One Golf has been modified to test
launch the SS-N-8 and has been designated Golf III. Two
other boats, the Golf IV and Golf V are test platforms for
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SS-N-6 and other missiles. The remaining Golf I's may have
had their missiles removed and serve as general purpose
boats. [Ref. 11, 1980-81: p. 474] The Golf lis serve in
theater forces in the Baltic and Pacific. [Ref. 11, 19 81-
82: p. 479]
A single Hotel has been extensively modified to launch
six SS-N-8 missiles from an enlarged sail and is designated
Hotel III. This submarine is included in SALT I force levels
The disposition of other Hotels is largely unknown. [Ref.
11, 1981-82: p. 478]
As the Soviets have completed new Delta submarines, they
have removed the missile tubes from Yankees to adhere to
SALT limits. As of 19 82, they have pared their Yankee force
level to twenty-nine. Of the remaining boats of this class,
one is armed with the SS-N-17, eighteen with the MRV mod.
of the Sawfly and the remainder with the single warhead
SS-N-6. [Ref. 11, 1980-81: p. 472]
The 19 82 Soviet Order of Battle included one Hotel III,
twenty-nine Yankees, eighteen Delta I's, four Delta II' s,
twelve Delta Ill's and one Typhoon, which is undergoing sea
trials. Dr. Donald Daniel of the Naval Postgraduate School
has speculated that the Soviet Union is slowing its missile
submarine acquisition rate in favor of general purpose forces
Although SALT may be a factor in slowed construction rates,
an inventory increase of over 70 0% in the last decade may be
deemed adequate for Soviet security by Soviet planners.
[Ref. 21: pp. 71-72]
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Soviet SSBN and SLBM development has been gradual and
steady, with continuing increases in capability and numbers.
One of many approaches to problems of national security and
support of Kremlin foreign policies, the FBM force is a
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SOVIET UNDERSEA STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES BY YEAR
TOTAL TOTAL WARHEADS OR OPERATIONAL
SSB/ TOTAL INDEPENDENTLY RANGE
YEAR SSBNS LAUNCHERS TARGETED VEHICLES (NAUTICAL MILES) CAPABILITIES
1958 1 2 2 370 Sark Missile
9 3 6 6
1960 4 8 8
1 5 10 10
2 12 30 30 vj/
3 28 78 78 370-900 Serb Missile
4 34 96 96
5 38 108 108
6 38 108 108 ]/
7 40 140 140 370-1600 SS-N-6
8 42 172 172
9 44 204 204
1970 46 224 224
V
47 266 266 \ f
20 312 312 1300-4800 SS-N-8
3 28 436 436
4 40 610 610 MRV on SS-N-6
5 42 634 634
6 47 702 702
7 54 794 794 SS-N-17
8 60 890 >1180 SS-N-18 MIRV
9 64 942 >1200
1980 64 942 >1200
1 64 942 >1200
2 64 942 >1200 > /
[Refs. 4, 9, 11]
In 1972, under provisions of the SALT I accords, all SS-N-4 and some
SS-N-5 equipped submarines were not considered strategic delivery vehicles
because of limited ranges. Although this apparent reduction in force
levels is artificial, it serves to more accurately reflect Soviet capa-
bility to strike the U.S. with SLBMs. Therefore, after 1971, the chart





Quality of construction and technology is a major deter-
mining factor of weapon system effectiveness. However,
additional measures of effectiveness include systems employ-
ment doctrine which exploit advantages and overcome hardware
deficiencies. Thus, operational considerations of U.S. and
Soviet SSBN employment are traced, specifically regarding




United States SSBNs are manned by about fifteen
officers and 125 enlisted men. Personnel selected for sub-
marine duty are carefully screened for mental, psychological
and physical ability to withstand what is considered
challenging and stressful duty. Training is extensive,
covering a wide range of SSBN systems including the science
of nuclear power. Men who "qualify" as submariners have
thorough knowledge of virtually all essential submarine and
weapon systems, resulting in redundant capabilities of a




Two complete crews are assigned to each SSBN, desig-
nated Blue and Gold. They relieve one another on a schedule
of approximately every three months and the evolution requires
two to three days. The off-duty crew maintains proficiency
through extensive refresher and cross-training. [Ref. 13:
pp. 14-15]
2 . Basing and Support
Polaris SSBNs were administratively assigned to
Groton, Connecticut; Charleston, South Carolina; King's Bay,
Georgia; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Forward basing with
support tenders (AS) was established at Rota, Spain; Apra
Harbor, Guam; and Holy Loch, Scotland. With the introduction
of the long range Trident I missile to the fleet, the Rota
site was vacated in 19 79 and Guam in 19 80. Poseidon boats
continue to deploy from Holy Loch. [Ref. 23]
The new Trident submarine base at Bangor, Washington
was completed and turned over to the fleet in July 19 81.
Construction at King's Bay to support an additional squadron
of Ohio class SSBNs is scheduled for completion in 19 89.
[Ref. 12, pp. 3-7]
Pre-Ohio class SSBNs require a 32 day refit after
70 days of operational patrol. A major 16 month overhaul
is accomplished every six years. The Ohio and its successors
are expected to increase SSBN at-sea time by 21%. Seventy
day patrols will follow twenty-five day refits and major
overhaul will occur at approximately nine year intervals.




The patrol routine of U.S. SSBNs is tedious. Sub-
merging soon after leaving port, they proceed to station
somewhere well off the shipping lanes and hover at a depth
of about 100 to 200 feet. The boats make little headway
while on station and trail a communications antenna on or
near the surface. Since 19 75, Poseidon SSBN's have interrupted
their on-station periods with mid-patrol port visits. [Ref.
22]
The U.S. Navy maintains 50 to 55% of its SSBNs on
patrol at any one time. [Ref. 25: pp. 63-69] Because of
their mobility, submarines give their medium range missiles
an intercontinental capability. No point on earth is more
than 2,000 miles from the sea and a submarine with 2,900
nautical mile missiles is within range of every conceivable
target. [Ref. 26: p. 73]
Polaris and Poseidon patrols have been conducted in
the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Mediterranean
Sea. Trident I equipped boats can cover their targets from
patrols closer to home waters. [Ref. 7: pp. 20-21]
Figure 1 depicts the operational sea areas from which
SLBMs could hit Soviet targets, assuming Moscow as the central
focus of attention. Figure 2 depicts sea areas within
targeting of major population centers and industrial complexes
within 200 miles of the Soviet border. The solid areas
depict operational range patrol areas of a Polaris missile
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equipped boat. The outer lines define possible patrol areas
of Poseidon and Trident I and projected Trident II missiles
respectively. Black dots denote home ports and forward bases
of the FBM fleet. The direct relationship between increasing
missile range and potential sea areas from which to conduct
patrols is evident. The Trident I missile allows a fourteen
million square mile patrol area to remain within targeting
range. [Ref. 28: pp. 36-39]
4 . Communications
Maintaining secure and reliable communications with
strategic forces is a particularly difficult problem for
national leaderships. The problem is particularly acute with
SSBNs because of the requirement to communicate through two
media, air and water, and the desire to maintain stealth.
[Ref. 29: p. 8] To provide effective nuclear deterrence,
the FBM force must be able to respond immediately to a launch
command.
The communications network which has been established
to ensure a responsive strategic force is necessarily complex
and redundant. The primary system for transmitting the
Emergency Action Messages (EAM) to SSBNs is a network of six
very low frequency (VLF) stations based on land. The sub-
marines on patrol are able to copy a VLF message via a
trailing antenna or buoy while submerged and monitor their
VLF circuits continuously. If communications are broken,
the boats are required to surface and establish reception
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on back-up high frequency (HF) , ultra-high frequency (UHF)
or low frequency (LF) radios. [Ref. 30]
Providing further communications capability, the
Navy maintains C-130 "TACAMO" aircraft airborne on a con-
tinuous basis. Equipped with several VLF radios, the TACAMO
planes can relay messages from elements of the National
Military Command System to the SSBNs should the primary
system fail. [Ref. 31: p. 6]
Other recent improvements to the strategic communi-
cations network include hardening of the VLF stations against
overpressure and rapid data transfer capability in two-way
satellite transmissions.
A proposed Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) system
could further enhance communications reliability. The ELF '
s
long wave length is resistant to degradation in a nuclear
environment and can penetrate water twenty times deeper than
VLF. [Ref. 31: p. 3] The controversial system has not yet
been approved for construction.
C. SOVIET UNION
1. Personnel
Complements for Soviet SSBN's are 86 officers and
men aboard Golfs, 90 in Hotels, 120 in Yankees and Deltas and
about 150 aboard Typhoon. [Ref. 32: pp. 212-215] One crew
is assigned to each submarine.
Most enlisted men in Soviet SSBNs are three year
conscripts. The few who are retained beyond their initial
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tour usually attain the rank of warrant officer (the equiv-
alent of American E-6 or E-7)
.
Officers serve very lengthy tours, usually aboard
the same submarine. Almost all are graduates of the Leninsky
Komsomol Higher Naval School of Submarine Navigation in
Leningrad, one of eleven Soviet schools which are the rough
equivalent of the U.S. Naval Academy. [Ref. 14: p. 39]
Submariners are the elite of the Soviet Navy and a
special initiation ceremony is meant to instill a sense of
distinction and pride in the most prestigious arm of the VMF.
Few professional officers leave the submarine community for
other types of duty. [Ref. 33: p. 108]
2 . Basing and Support
Soviet SSBNs are home ported at the three major bases
of Severomorsk near Murmansk, Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka
Peninsula and Vladivostock on the Sea of Japan.
The 1981 Jane's Fighting Ships listed 46 SSBNs
assigned to the Northern Fleet and 24 to the Pacific Fleet.
Of the Golf SSB's, five were in the Northern, six in the
Baltic (since 1976), and eight in the Pacific Fleets. [Ref.
11, 1981-82: p. 470]
Soviet SSBN's spend the vast majority of their time
pierside. Regular maintenance is therefore easily completed
during long in-port periods. Major overhaul is conducted
about every eight to nine years and requires up to thirty-




An average of only 15% of Soviet SSBNs are on patrol
or at sea at any one time. [Ref. 23: p. 27] It is believed,
however, that during a war or in an immediate pre-war period,
the VMF would sortie all SSBNs and SSBs able to put to sea
to avoid destruction and await orders. [Ref. 21: p. 77]
Golf and Hotel submarines, with their limited range
missiles, patrol coastal waters and contiguous seas in a
theater strike role. [Ref. 11, 1981-82: p. 479]
Sawfly-equipped Yankee SSBN's brought the SLBM threat
directly to the United States homeland, patrolling waters
near the east and west coasts of the North American continent
(and Asia) since 1971. [Ref. 34: p. 32] Throughout the
19 70s, the Soviets maintained three Yankees in the western
Atlantic, one in western Pacific and one in the eastern
Pacific. [Ref. 35: p. 205] To bring their missiles within
range of coastal and inland targets of the United States
required long transits in open ocean, expending as much as
one third of a patrol's duration or six to eight days steaming
to and from station. [Ref. 6: p. 24]
Deltas are within range of North American targets
from home waters at Murmansk and Petropavlovsk and they
patrol in limited protected areas of the North Pacific and
Barents Sea. [Ref. 36: p. 63] As Deltas have entered the
operational fleet, Yankees have probably been drawn back from
forward areas for theater or tactical strike missions. [Ref.
15: p. 14 8]
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Figure 3 depicts the operational sea areas from which
SLBMs could hit targets anywhere in the United States. Figure
4 displays increased flexibility afforded by targeting only
within 200 miles of the U.S. borders. Alaska and Hawaii are
excluded from consideration. The solid areas represent Yankee
missile ranges and, the outer broken lines, the increase in
patrol area flexibility of follow on ballistic missiles for
Delta. As previously mentioned, the Soviets do not take
advantage of increased patrol areas afforded by better missile
ranges, opting rather to maintain their Deltas in contiguous
waters.
4. Communications
Soviet naval communications are based on a series of
redundant and reliable systems which ensure secure links
with all operational units including SSBNs. The network
includes VLF stations, land lines, satellite relays and HF
transmitters. Secure communications enable strict and direct
control over the FBM force by the High Command or STAVKA.
[Ref. 35: p. 59]
Control over ballistic missile submarines which
remain close to the homeland such as Golf, Hotel and Delta
do not present great difficulties for communications net-
works. Relatively short range and low power systems are
adequate for limited patrols.
When Yankees patrol in forward stations, it is
assumed that communications are accomplished using transfer
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links from Moscow such as long range Bear reconnaissance
aircraft, intelligence gathering ships or A.G.I.'s and land-
based transmitters in Cuba.
D. CONCLUSION
Differences in U.S. and Soviet SSBN operational practices
reflect divergent capabilities and military priorities.
Similarities in quality of personnel and communications pro-
cedures and redundancy indicate some constancy in the demands





V. THE SSBN IN UNITED STATES STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
To date, undersea strategic nuclear forces have been
available to seven United States administrations. Throughout
that time SSBN and SLBM technology and capabilities have
evolved and improved. The public doctrine which governs the
purpose and employment of U.S. strategic forces in general,
and the submarine arm of those forces specifically, has also
evolved through various presidencies. Usually, a change in
administration has marked a fresh look at nuclear doctrine,
an assessment of effectiveness of past policies, and promul-
gation of new approaches in future national security and
defense. The evolution of American strategic doctrine is,
therefore, usefully divided into eras of presidential leader-
ship, documented by the cabinet officers who enunciated
policy.
Each administration's doctrine is examined for announced
strategic objectives and general policy governing nuclear
forces and defense, and the stated position or purpose of
SSBNs in attaining the objectives. Specific issues which
elucidate the contribution of the submarine ballistic missile
force to national security policies are total force levels;
current and planned technology and weapons capabilities
(warhead yield, range and accuracy) ; and targeting and
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operational assignment, which reflect both force levels and
capabilities.
B. 'STRATEGIC DOCTRINE' DEFINED
In American parlance, strategic doctrine refers to policy
which governs objectives and plans of employment of nuclear
weapons. As in the case of U.S. SLBM's,both theater or
regional and intercontinental general forces would fall under
the direction and guidance of American strategic doctrine.
C. U.S. DOCTRINE AND DETERRENCE
The primary goal of United States strategic doctrine has
consistently been deterrence. The success of a deterrence
strategy depends on the ability to convince an adversary
that to attempt to gain a particular objective would cost
more than its worth. Concurrently, the cost to the deterrer
(the United States in this case) of applying the deterrent
(strategic forces) must appear to be less than conceding
the objective sought by the adversary. Implicit in the
calculus of deterrence cost-benefit is the credibility of
the threat to use military forces to achieve or deny achieve-
ment of objectives and a rational adversary who is fully
informed and understands one's own commitment to concede or
deny an objective. [Ref. 37: p. 33]
The semantic rule, strategic = nuclear, applies uniquely
to American usage of the terms.
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The American understanding of deterrence produces a
doctrine which is defense-oriented, that is, prepared to
fight should deterrence fail, but reluctant to strike a first
nuclear blow. Thus, the primary attribute required of any
deterrent force is the ability to survive a first strike by
the enemy. [Ref. 6: p. 15] Most of the evolution of U.S.
strategic doctrine can be attributed to the refinement of
response possibilities to a first strike by the Soviet Union.
D. EISENHOWER
1. Doctrine and Policy
The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense
on 'United States Objectives and Programs for National
Security' of April 7, 1950, better known by its serial number,
NSC-6 8, was a call to arms. Warning of dark Soviet intentions,
it urged that the United States assume a leadership position
in the Free World, build up its nuclear and general purpose
forces, and thwart the huge threat posed by the expansion-
minded Kremlin leadership. [Ref. 25: p. 58]
By 195 3, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, was articulating a "New Look" policy,
with emphasis on defense through nuclear weapons at the
expense of conventional forces. The administration was
preparing the nation for a long term confrontation with the
Soviet Union, and thus, sought defense solutions which were
effective but affordable. The weapons effectiveness standard
of "maximum deterrent at a bearable cost" would be fulfilled
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by nuclear force levels sufficient to deter Soviet aggression
by "...a great capacity to retaliate, instantly..." Although
the threat of a massive retaliatory attack provided the
ultimate deterrent, Eisenhower and Dulles sought the ability
to respond to aggression "...by means and at places of our
choosing," that is, selectively, should deterrence fail.
[Ref. 38]
The bulk of the administration's deterrent and
retaliatory capability was provided by the long range bomber
force of the Strategic Air Command. [Ref. 25: pp. 58-59]
However, in the mid-1950 *s research and development was
ongoing for alternative weapons and delivery vehicles,
including the submarine- launched ballistic missile.
In August 195 7, the Soviet Union first flight tested
an ICBM. In October of that year Sputnik was launched into
orbit and Sputnik II followed in November. Also in 1957,
Rowan Gaither, head of the Ford Foundation, submitted a
secret report to the National Security Council warning of
advances in Soviet strategic capability. He stated that by
1959, the Soviet Union would possess 100 ICBM's and the
capability to launch a nuclear strike on the United States.
President Eisenhower, however, had obtained intel-
ligence provided by U-2 aircraft photos which indicated that
the Soviet Union had halted ICBM tests after the initial
firing in 1957. He rejected Gaither' s call for a massive
fallout shelter program and warnings of a potential "missile
gap" of Soviet superiority by 1962. [Ref. 39: pp. 90-91]
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The public and the Congress did not share the
President's knowledge or confidence. Twice in the late 1950*3,
the Democratic-controlled Congress appropriated several hun-
dred million dollars more for construction of Polaris sub-
marines than Eisenhower requested. [Ref. 1, pp. 8-9] The
SLBM's were a particularly attractive weapons system under
circumstances of a Soviet threat because of their ability to
survive a surprise attack and retaliate. [Ref. 25: pp. 58-59]
The administration did, in fact, respond to the
Soviet threat, but in a deliberate manner. Eisenhower formed
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to
compete with Soviet achievements in space. He supported the
better second generation Polaris and Minutemen missiles over
their liquid fuel predecessors. [Ref. 39: pp. 90-91]
Eisenhower also approved termination of the Regulus air
breathing missile program in favor of the more promising
ballistic technology. [Ref. 40: p. 162]
To command and control new strategic forces which
expanded beyond exclusive Air Force purview, President
Eisenhower formed the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
to coordinate nuclear targeting. The Air Force commander
of the Strategic Air Command was assigned to head the staff
with a Navy flag officer as his deputy. One of their duties
was to prepare the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or





In February and April of 1958, construction was
approved for five ballistic missile submarines. The Wash-
ington class SSBNs and their successors began to conduct
operational patrols in Eisenhower's final year in office.
By the end of 1960 two SSBNs were at sea armed with 32 A-l
missiles. As new members of the American strategic forces,
the submarines helped to fulfill the Defense Department's
two-fold objectives for national security: "...to deter the
outbreak of a major war by defending the home base and
striking back decisively against any aggressor...," and
"... to prevent or contain local wars by being ready to come
to the aid of threatened friendly nations, if necessary..."
[Ref. 41: p. 1]
3. Technology
Although its range was limited to about 1200 nautical
miles, the A-l missile's submarine launch platform's mobility
gave it an intercontinental capability. However, Polaris'
most attractive characteristic was its invulnerability due
to underwater launch. Its retaliatory capability was assured
and was, therefore, an effective deterrent as a survivable
threat of assured destruction. [Ref. 42: p. 144] Further,
the SSBN could reach its targets without reliance on forward
stations. The Secretary of the Navy reported in 19 58:
"...the fleet ballistic missile system will provide a
practically invulnerable retaliatory weapon, independent of
foreign bases." [Ref. 41: p. 220]
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4. Targeting and Assignment
The Al's one megaton warhead with an accuracy of one
to two miles limited its possible targeting assignment to
sprawling industrial or population centers. Such an
assignment seems crude but would have been effective in a
strategy based on massive retaliation. The Eisenhower
administration was, however, dedicated to further refinement
of FBM technology and had created the means in the S.I.O.P.
to incorporate more sophisticated capabilities into
operational plans.
E . KENNEDY
1. Doctrine and Policy
One of the Congressmen who charged President Eisen-
hower with not adequately addressing the alleged missile gap
was Senator John F. Kennedy from Massachusetts. He
predicted: "The deterrent ratio during 1960-1964 will in
all likelihood be weighted against us." [Ref. 39: p. 90]
Kennedy continued to harp on the U.S. strategic
forces as a presidential campaign issue. When he assumed
office in the White House in January 1961, he was determined
to correct what he viewed as two fundamental flaws in the
nation's military posture: the inadequacies of both stra-
tegic deterrent and conventional capabilities. [Ref. 43:
p. 78] Kennedy's newly appointed Defense Secretary, Robert
A. McNamara, reiterated Eisenhower's knowledge of the
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fallacy of the missile gap, yet the President persisted in
his goals of across-the board military build-up. [Ref. 39:
p. 1113
Kennedy formulated his strategic doctrine and plans
based on the writings of General Maxwell D. Taylor. In The
Uncertain Trumpet
,
[Ref. 44] Tayler outlined a national
military program of "Flexible Response" and rejected the
strategy of Massive Retaliation. Eisenhower's doctrine had
not advocated a general nuclear exchange in response to any
contingency. Nevertheless, Taylor saw inadequacies in
excessive reliance on nuclear weapons for national defense.
There were limitations in atomic deterrent forces and Taylor
urged preparation for more limited forms of conflict.
In a speech given at Ann Arbor, Michigan in 196 2,
Defense Secretary McNamara articulated one of two primary
objectives in the administration's flexible response strategy
He stated that there would be a continuing dedication to a
'no first strike' capability and that the targets of the
retaliatory strike would be limited to military forces only,
the so-called 'no cities' doctrine. Thus, the strategic
objective of ' counterforce ' targeting was revealed to the
public.
During Congressional testimony, McNamara outlined
his second major strategic objective. He stated that the
administration would pursue "...a meaningful capability to
limit the damage of a determined enemy attack..." by building
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"...an integrated, balanced combination of strategic offensive
forces, area defense forces, terminal defense forces and
passive defenses." [Ref. 45; 46]
The administration hoped that counterforce targeting
would encourage the Soviets to seek similar objectives. A
highly survivable retaliatory strategic force would contribute
to deterrence and more balanced conventional and tactical
nuclear forces would allow a range of options in situations
short of a general exchange.
2 . Force Level
To achieve flexible options across the entire spec-
trum of conflict, President Kennedy rejected Eisenhower's
force level philosophy of sufficiency. For the early 1960's,
the United States would seek superiority in strategic arms.
The administration's first step toward increasing
strategic capabilities was to accelerate the existing Polaris
program by two years. [Ref. 47: p. 8]
In January 1961, there were two SSBNs on patrol and
twelve more under construction or fitting out. Kennedy
immediately ordered five additional boats and requested funds
for ten more. The proposed end force level of a 45 SSBN fleet
was projected by the end of the decade. In 1962, Secretary
McNamara cut this plan to 41 boats and 656 launchers, re-
flecting a reported desire for balanced modernization and





SLBM technology available in 1961 did not contribute
significantly to a selective counterforce targeting doctrine.
A study conducted that year by the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee
of the National Security Council concluded that the entire
strategic force was inadequate for the counterforce objective
Among other improvements, it recommended the development of
improved C.E.P.s and a variety of yield options for SLBM
warheads. [Ref. 48: pp. 12-13]
Missiles available to the Kennedy administration were
the Polaris A-l and A-2 with one megaton warheads, accurate
to two miles. It is not likely that such a weapon would
limit peripheral damage adequately for a clearly counterforce
targeting plan.
4. Targeting and Assignment
During the early 1960s, discussions of Polaris capa-
bilities did not emphasize accuracy. Rather, those qualities
which were touted included survivability and reliability for
second strike. Admiral Burke testified: "These character-
istics guarantee inevitable retaliation to the enemy, should
he mount a surprise attack." [Ref. 49: p. 898]
By default, then, the FBM force's function under
Kennedy continued to be a countervalue urban-centers strike
platform. While the Strategic Air Command held responsibilities
for surgical counterforce strikes, the Navy's Polaris force
provided the ultimate deterrent, an invulnerable assured
destruction back-up. [Ref. 48: pp. 39-40; Ref. 37: p. 2 43]
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The I960 SIOP inherited by Kennedy's planners
called for a single large nuclear strike, the so-called mas-
sive retaliation of the Eisenhower administration. Changes
made to the plan in 196 2 were indicative of further refine-
ment of the SSBN role in strategic plans. The concept of a
reserve force, withheld from an initial nuclear exchange, to
contribute to intra-war deterrence, was developed. [Ref.
50: p. 97] Survivability of the SLBM's ensured inclusion
in such a role. Flexible response was to be applicable not
only to all-types of conflict but also to various stages of
conflict escalation. It was possible that a pause might
follow a counterforce second strike during which further
enemy aggression could be deterred by the U.S. capability
to selectively spare or destroy urban and industrial centers
with Polaris missiles. [Ref. 51]
F. JOHNSON
1. Doctrine and Policy
Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency in November
196 3. The continuation of Robert McNamara as Defense Secre-
tary ensured some continuity in policy and strategic doctrine
The momentum of the Kennedy arms build-up carried
over after his death. From 1961 to June 1964, the number
of warheads in the strategic alert force increased 150%;
number of bombers, 50%; and the number of combat divisions,
45%. [Ref. 52: p. 3] In 1964, SSBN production reached its
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zenith with twelve boats commissioned that year. [Ref. 2:
p. 56]
By 1965, events were overtaking McNamara's commitment
to counterforce targeting, damage limitation and force
superiority. The growing conventional arms costs of Vietnam
diverted potential funds for strategic systems. The Soviet
Union had also launched its own across-the-board arms build-
up, presenting an increasingly serious challenge to both
damage limitation defenses and American surperiority in
offensive systems.
Although declaratory policy from 1964 through 1966
included damage limitation as a basic strategic objective,
during that time McNamara began to privately advocate an
assured destruction deterrence strategy. Expanding Soviet
capabilities served to reciprocate the threat to entire
societies, thus necessitating the term, "Mutual Assured
Destruction.
"
Desmond Ball cites four reasons for McNamara's
abandonment of counterforce strategy [Ref. 48: pp. 15-16]:
First, counterforce targeting was criticized in the United
States for its first strike implications. To destroy the
enemy's offensive capability requires striking silos with
missiles still in them; hence, first strike. Second, in
public statements, the Soviets doubted that conflict could
be controlled as suggested in a flexible response strategy
and, therefore, any response by their forces would be general,
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targeting military and civilian population centers. Third,
to the European allies of NATO, a counterforce "no cities"
doctrine implied a renunciation of the assured destruction
deterrence strategy which threatened all of Soviet society.
It was a doctrine which, to them, weakened the U.S. nuclear
guarantee of their territorial integrity. Fourth, the cost
of obtaining a force of adequate numbers and accuracy for
survivable counterforce, and adequate defenses against enemy
strategic systems, was prohibitive, especially with the
competing economic demands in Southeast Asia.
2. Force Level
The resultant M.A.D. strategic policy marked the
abandonment of both counterforce offensive and damage limiting
defensive capabilities. The United States unilaterally halted
further deployment of strategic weapons after 196 7, freezing
force levels at 1054 ICBMs , several hundred B-52 bombers and
41 ballistic missile submarines with 656 launchers. The
force level objective of "sufficiency" again replaced superi-
ority. It was hoped that the Soviet Union would reciprocate,
enhancing an environment of cooperation, leading to arms
limitations negotiations, and maintaining a stable stalemate
of Mutual Assured Destruction. [Ref. 53: p. 370] While
American forces remained constant for the next thirteen years,




During Johnson's administration the MRV Polaris A-3
missiles became operational, improving the deployed SLBM
force's penetration capability against Soviet anti-ballistic
missile systems. This development enhanced the FBM force as
an assured destruction reserve deterrent. However, ongoing
research and development created debate within government
circles about the future role of SLBM's in U.S. strategy.
Follow-on warhead technology to the Polaris was progressing
in the mid-1950s. As a next step to MRV capability, independ-
ently targeted warheads or MIRVs were test- launched from
single bus stages. The new warheads could not only exasperate
anti-missile defenses, but also potentially knock out hardened
"time urgent" targets such as missile silos with the combi-
nation of multiple hits and requisite accuracy. Thus,
Poseidon developmental goals followed two tracks, to be
effective against soft urban/industrial targets and hardened
counterforce sites. The dual purpose nature of Poseidon was
a closely kept secret within the Administration, however,
because of McNamara's public commitment to abandonment of
counterforce capability. [Ref. 1: pp. 220-221]
4. Targeting and Assignment
The SIOP remained unchanged during the Johnson
administration, although the pure counterforce option was
considered of less value. Rather, the countervalue portions
of the plan received greater emphasis. [Ref. 48: pp. 16-17]
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The Polaris force's unimproved standing in capability
reinforced its position as a reserve urban-industrial
targeted deterrent and bolstered McNamara 's revised doctrine.
In the report to Congress on the Fiscal Year 19 6 9 Defense
Budget, he praised Polaris' contribution to an Assured
Destruction strategy because of inherent survivability/
enabled by high mobility and concealment. [Ref. 54: p. 43]
McNamara expressed confidence that even in worst case
scenarios of massive surprise attack, adequate SLBMs would
survive to deliver a devastating blow, estimated to destroy
1/5 to 1/4 of the Soviet population and 1/2 of its industrial
capacity. [Ref. 54: p. 50] Further, McNamara publicly
assessed future FBM capabilities with introduction of
Poseidon to the fleet as increased penetration capability
and survivability, not enhanced counterforce features.
[Ref. 54: p. 59]
G. NIXON
1. Doctrine and Policy
During the 196 8 Presidential campaign, Richard Nixon
demanded that the United States return to a position of
nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. However, when
he took office, it was clear that sufficiency would remain
the force levels goal during his administration. Superiority,
he said, was an inappropriate approach to the problem of
national security. [Ref. 48: p. 5]
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The President, and his Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird/
defined sufficiency as enough military force to deter an all-
out surprise attack with adequate second strike capability;
to provide no incentive, through perceived U.S. weakness,
for the Soviets to launch a first strike in a crisis; to
prevent Soviet superiority in urban/industrial destruction
capability; and to defend against damage from small attacks
or accidental launches. [Ref. 55: p. 62]
Laird's key concept in defense planning was "Realistic
Deterrence," which would discourage and ultimately eliminate
the use of military force as a foreign policy tool. To
achieve his goals, 'Total Force Planning 1 which realized a
realistic mixture of military forces, and 'Net Assessment,'
which accounted for all factors of national power - military,
technological, political and economic - would be the analyt-
ical tools to arrive at sufficient force levels. [Ref. 56]
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, appointed in
19 73, reaffirmed the administration's commitment to the
assured destruction (AD) capability. He stressed, however,
that the countervalue implication of AD was to be only one
of many options. Further, not only could the threat of AD
serve as the ultimate, doomsday deterrent, but the option
might also contribute to an intra-war deterrent situation.
An invulnerable reserve force could aid in focusing Soviet




Schlesinger thus expanded U.S. strategic objectives
to include "limited strategic options," the capability to
control nuclear exchanges through survivable communications,
retargetable weapons tailored to changing scenarios and
contingencies, and sufficient accuracy and precision in
nuclear strikes to ensure minimum civilian fatalities.
Limited options implied an extended war-fighting capability,
and control of escalation throughout a conflict with deliberate
and selective counterforce strikes.
A third element of the Schlesinger Doctrine was the
commitment to force levels reflecting "essential equivalence"
with the Soviet Union. This translated into the minimum
objective of a perceived parity with the Soviets in strategic
capabilities, in order to maintain a credible deterrent in
the eyes of the European allies and Kremlin leadership.
[Ref. 57]
The budgetary impact of nuclear sufficiency and
essential equivalence was austerity. [Ref. 58: p. 2] The
primary military concerns of the Nixon administration were
the Vietnamization of the Southeast Asian conflict and the
completion of the SALT accords with the Soviet Union. Current
strategic force levels were adequate at all levels of
potential conflict and defense against a Soviet offensive




In the atmosphere of budget austerity and mutual arms
limitations, the SLBM force level remained frozen at 656
launchers. The SALT I agreements signed in May 19 72 had no
real impact on the U.S. FBM assets either.
The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms
froze for five years the ICBMs and SLBMs at the level existent
or under construction as of 26 May 19 72. At the time no new
U.S. SLBM launchers were under construction or planned for
the near future. Although the Protocol to the Interim Agree-
ment allowed an eventual numerical ceiling of 710 U.S. tubes
and 44 boats, the United States had no intention of attaining
the higher ceilings. [Ref. 37: pp. 522-523]
3. Technology
The most significant reason that SALT I had no effect
on SLBM capabilities was the absence of stipulations involving
MIRV technology. A U.S. proposed ban on MIRV was rejected by
the Soviet Union in the spring of 1970. [Ref. 25: p. 62]
Therefore, while freezing numbers of launchers at 19 72 levels,
the Navy's deterrent and retaliatory capabilities increased
multifold with introduction of MIRVed Poseidon missiles to
the fleet.
As stated earlier, the designers of Poseidon pursued
a counterforce or anti-silo capability in the mid 1960s. In
1967 according to Joel A. Wit [Ref. 59: p. 163], the Navy
would have begun the development of a stellar corrected
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inertial guidance system which would yield sufficient warhead
accuracy to destroy hardened targets. However, funds for
such a capability were repeatedly refused by Congress between
1969 and 1973.
A counterforce SLBM would have been very effective
in Secretary Schlesinger ' s limited options doctrine with the
ability to selectively strike the Kremlin's offensive capa-
bility. Although not addressed in the signed SALT accords,
MIRV and counterforce capability were major issues during
the negotiating process. [Ref. 25: p. 62] Rather than
inflame superpower relations with unilateral American second
strike counterforce capability in a supposed era of negoti-
ation and parity, the Congressional leadership sought to
calm Soviet fears by denying U.S. SLBM's that capability.
The resultant approved warhead yield - accuracy mix for
Poseidon (50 KT. - 1500-1800 feet) was not capable of
knocking out a hardened ICBM silo. [Ref. 48: p. 22]
In order to garner Pentagon support for the SALT
accords, Nixon pledged increased support for the ULMS or
Trident SSBN program. A counterforce Poseidon missile would
be sacrificed for future systems capabilities. Schlesinger '
s
predecessor, Melvin Laird, had stated his FBM objectives,
which continued through the Nixon years:
I have carefully reviewed all alternatives for new
strategic initiatives and have decided that acceleration
of the ULMS program is the most appropriate alternative,
since the at sea portion of our sea-based strategic
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forces has the best long term prospect for high pre-
launch survivability. [Ref. 4, 19 72-73: p. 409]
That same year, Laird proposed the development of a sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM) as a hedge against future
negotiated limitations to the FBM force. [Ref. 4: p. 110]
4. Targeting and Assignment
As a reflection of the Schlesinger Doctrine, guidance
for development of the SIOP in 19 74 re-emphasized the
targeting of a wide range of military forces and installations,
Also identified were exempt or withheld sites which either
would not be targeted (e.g, purely urban centers with no
military-economic potential) or which would be spared in an
initial exchange, such as political leadership locales needed
for intra-war negotiations. [Ref. 60] SLBMs , it is pre-
sumed, were assigned targets such as unhardened military
installations, airfields and troop formations, and those
which would be spared initially, thus requiring a survivable
reserve capability.
As an element of Schlesinger ' s limited options plan,
some U.S. SLBM launchers were assigned to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe in support of NATO theater operations.
Potential war time assignment included selective strikes on
bases and supply lines which support an enemy offensive.
[Ref. 53: p. 170] This new role of tactical support for a
continental conflict involving the European allies bolstered
the existing treaty guarantee of protection under the American




1. Doctrine and Policy
In the summer of 19 74, Gerald R. Ford assumed the
Presidency, shortly thereafter naming Donald Rumsfeld as his
Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld outlined the administration's
major objectives of the strategic nuclear forces to Congress,
largely a reiteration of the tenets of the Nixon and
Schlesinger doctrines:
1. To maintain a well-protected second strike force to
deter attacks on cities and people;
2. To provide the capability for more controlled and
measured responses in order to deter less than all-
out attacks;
3. To ensure an essential equivalence with the Soviet
Union, now and in the future;
4. To maintain stability in nuclear competition, fore-
saking a disarming first strike capability and
seeking equitable arms agreements, where possible.
[Ref. 61: p. iii]
In November 19 74, President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev
signed the Vladivostock Accord, agreeing to limit the total
number of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear vehicles to
2,400, of which 1,300 could be MIRVed. [Ref. 37: pp. 523-524]
The central goal of the Ford-Rumsfeld doctrine was to
maintain a high confidence second strike capability within
the agreed upon Vladivostock limit. Deterrence, it was
hoped, would be accomplished "through flexibility and the




The Poseidon conversion on thirty-one U.S. SSBN's was
completed in 19 74. Thus, the total number of warheads in
the FBM force levelled off at about 4000. Although noting
the advancing age of the submarines, the administration felt
that the current strategic force levels were adequate for
present defense plans. [Ref. 61: p. iii; Ref. 36: p. 21]
3. Technology
Donald Rumsfeld stated that an assured second strike
capability is the prime condition for deterrence, the ability
to destroy 30% of the Soviet population in 200 urban centers.
This would "...retard significantly the ability of the U.S.S.R.
to recover from a nuclear exchange and regain the status of a
20th century military and industrial power more rapidly than
the United States." [Ref. 36: pp. 67-68]
However, the restraint displayed by the United States
in holding to this assured destruction goal was not recipro-
cated by the Soviets. Rumsfeld commented on their growing
offensive capability:
The Soviets are gaining the capability in an initial
counterforce attack to withhold a large percentage of
their forces with which they could retaliate in kind.
On the part of the United States:
Our own SLBMs - both on station and in transit - would
still be intact, and we believe that our alert bombers
would retain a high probability of penetrating to Soviet
targets. But our own ability to disrupt the Soviet
follow-on force and cover many other important targets
of value would have diminished. Under these conditions,
our flexibility would be small; theirs would remain
substantial. [Ref. 61: pp. 47-49]
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A growing Soviet counterforce first and third strike
capability was increasing U.S. vulnerability to intra-war
nuclear blackmail. A purely countervalue second strike
force would mean that, following an initial exchange, the
United States would have only two alternatives: to launch
the assured destruction strike and cause annihilation of its
own cities as well, or to abdicate to Soviet desires. Fears
of such a lack of flexibility re-emphasized the need for
Trident and its counterforce capability along with further
improvements to the accuracy of the Poseidon missile.
4 . Targeting and Assignment
As the least vulnerable leg of the strategic TRIAD,
the SLBM force remained the backbone of the U.S. second
strike capability. [Ref. 61: p. 65] The range of targeting
options for the SSBNs remained unchanged from the Schlesinger
Doctrine, including the dedication of some launchers to NATO
theater operations. [Ref. 36: p. 148]
I. CARTER
1. Doctrine and Policy
In his 19 79 address to the Congress on the FY 19 80
Defense Budget, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown outlined
President Carter's new approach in strategic doctrine. The
requirement for nuclear retaliatory forces was met if those
forces could "survive in adequate numbers and types after
a... surprise attack; penetrate Soviet defenses...; if
necessary, inflict high levels of damage on Soviet
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society — particularly those elements the Soviet leadership
values..." [Ref. 62: p. 12]
As a guideline for employment of the American nuclear
weapons, Brown introduced the concept of a "Countervailing
Strategy." He described the new concept's meaning:
As a reasonable minimum (but this may also be the best
we can do) , we can make sure that, whatever the nature
of the attacks we foresee, we have the capability to
respond in such a way that the enemy could have no
expectation of achieving any rational objective, no
illusion of making any gain without offsetting losses.
There were four strategic capability goals stipulated
in the countervailing strategy:
1. Survivable C ;
2. High weapons accuracy (and some passive defense
measures;
3. A substantial target list;
4. Counterforce targeting with the ability to retarget
in intra-war phases (if empty silos are targeted)
.
[Ref. 62: p. 77]
The operational guidance for Carter's new strategy
was outlined in Presidential Directive 59 (PD 59) dated July
25, 19 80. It was described by the administration as a
"refinement" and "codification" of previous statements of
American strategic policy and not a radical new approach.
[Ref. 63: p. 268] It codified the evolution away from a
primarily countervalue , assured destruction strategy toward
one providing greater flexibility for the National Command
Authority, combining counterforce and countervalue targeting
to deter Soviet aggression through the capability to respond




The objective of the SALT II negotiations was main-
tenance of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union by-
persuading the Kremlin to exercise restraint in their build-
up of offensive forces. Again, this second round of talks
had no real effect on U.S. SLBM force levels. Rather, U.S.
strength would be determined by production and replacement
rate of Ohio class SSBNs for older boats. Stipulated limits
on total number of vehicles (2400 to 2250 by 1981), total
number of MIRVed missiles (1200), and allowable warheads on
MIRVed missiles (14), all provided ceilings well in excess
of U.S. construction plans. [Ref. 37: p. 529] President
Carter and Chairman Brezhnev both agreed to abide by the
limits of the unratified accords. During the Carter admin-
istration, the FBM force was maintained at forty-one boats
and 6 56 launchers. The commissioning of the U.S.S. Ohio,
delayed until November 19 81, and the retirement of the
Washington class SSBNs which began that year, both occurred
after his electoral defeat.
3. Technology
A second major objective of Carter's strategy was
high weapons accuracy. The improved C.E.P. Trident I missile
was introduced to the operational forces during his tenure
and the Improved Accuracy Program for Poseidon continued.
Carter placed considerable emphasis on the modern-
ization of the FBM force. [Ref. 64: p. 6] He wanted to
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ensure survivable modern SSBNs in the future, hedging against
possible Soviet ASW advances. The stated research and
3development goals were improved SLBM accuracy and C systems
to give greater effectiveness and flexibility "...in the
execution of various response options and as part of a secure
reserve." Support of the projected ability of the Trident II
missile to target the "entire Soviet target spectrum" (ie
including hardened targets) with better accuracy and throw
weight was indicative of the administration's support of a
counterforce SLBM capability. [Ref. 64: pp. 105-110]
Carter was careful, however, to emphasize a purely
second strike intent for new strategic forces. "Survivability
is the hallmark of our strategic modernization programs, for
survivable retaliatory forces are the essence of deterrence."
[Ref. 65: p. iv] Thus, other strategic forces deemed less
survivable than SSBN's, such as the B-l manned bomber program,
failed to garner the administration's support.
4 . Targeting and Assignment
In 19 81, Secretary Brown emphasized that counterforce
targeting for SLBMs was a capability of the future and not
within the I.O.C. of the Trident I missile: "Current SLBMs
lack the accuracy necessary for use against hardened targets,
and will not use the full throw-weight potential of the
Trident submarine launch tubes." [Ref. 65: p. 50] The role
of SSBN assets in being remained a reserve force with
essentially soft target assignments. [Ref. 65: pp. 40-42]
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As a result of PD 59 , the SIOP increased the number
of potential target installations from 25,000 in 19 74 to
about 40,000. Included were elements of Soviet nuclear forces,
conventional military forces, military and political leader-
ship, economic and Industrial targets, and other industry
which would contribute to economic recovery.
The SIOP identified four general categories of
options available: major attack, selected attack, limited
nuclear and regional nuclear options. Within each category
were subdivisions including "withholds," such as population
3
centers and C sites, the logical assignment for a reserve
SSBN force in an intra-war deterrence or flexible option
strategy. [Ref. 48: p. 6] The SLBMs surviving a Soviet
first strike, estimated to be at least 90% of those on patrol,
were capable of destroying about 75% of Soviet industrial
centers alone, if no military installations were targeted.
All reserve forces combined could take out the industrial
base, 90% of the military facilities besides silos and
between 20 and 95 million people. [Ref. 66: p. xi]
In the NATO theater, forty Poseidon launch tubes
were assigned to SACEUR for European targeting as of 19 80.
[Ref. 67: p. 39] However, their use remains the prerogative
of the National Command Authority. Carter's strategic
objective of the ability to retarget missiles during a con-
flict, a capability currently attributed to U.S. SLBM's,
could enhance a president's prerogative to assign or withhold
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particular SLBM tubes to NATO according to his own assessment
of operational need. [Ref. 62: p. 77; Ref. 29: p. 8]
J . REAGAN
1. Doctrine and Policy
Upon assuming office in January 19 81, President
Reagan announced a substantial increase in defense budgeting
to redress the imbalance of military strength with the Soviet
Union. His Defense Secretary, Casper Weinberger, emphasized
that the United States would not seek superiority but wanted
to ensure a "margin of safety necessary for our security."
The build-up is planned to span all military capabilities,
conventional and strategic. Further, all three legs of the
nuclear TRIAD are to be expanded, including the supporting
communications network. [Ref. 68: pp. 1-17, 1-18]
The purpose of nuclear forces in Reagan's strategic
plan encompasses four objectives:
1. To deter nuclear attack on the United States and its
allies
;
2. To help deter conventional attack against U.S. forces
and allies, especially those of NATO;
3. To impose termination of a major war on terms
favorable to the United States and its allies - even
if nuclear weapons have been used - and, in particular,
to deter escalation in the level of hostilities; and
4. To negate possible Soviet nuclear blackmail against
the United States or its allies.
The heart of Reagan's defense goals, according to
the FY 19 83 Defense Report, is to redress a military imbalance
caused by unilateral restraint in arms build-up by the United
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States. The Report claims a major contribution to the
imbalance is the history of arms negotiations with the Soviets
and, of greatest concern is the apparent vulnerability of
the United States in the mid-19 80' s to a devastating Soviet
counterforce first strike. [Ref. 68: p. 1-39]
2. Force Level
Reagan's strategic force goals include a survivable
second strike capability which deters at all levels of con-
flict with a "margin of safety." Although SLBM force levels
have declined during his administration because of block
obsolescence of the oldest SSBNs, the total number of boats
is stablized at 31 for several years. Additionally, Reagan
continues strong support for additional Ohio class SSBNs as
"the most survivable of our nuclear offensive systems."
[Ref. 68: p. 1-39]
3. Technology
President Reagan has requested funding for acquisition
of one Ohio class SSBN per year to a total of ten currently
authorized. He has expressed continuing support for more
accurate SLBM's in the future for a wide range of targets.
The Improved Accuracy Program for Poseidon has been cancelled
in favor of more intensive development of the more capable
Trident II D-5 missile [Ref. 68: p. 1-41]
4. Targeting and Assignment
In 19 81 Reagan adopted PD 59 as his administration's
strategic operational plan. However, the document: is
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currently in the process of modification to achieve a better
nuclear war-fighting stance. Targeting changes include
. . 3planned destruction of enemy political and C centers to
gain victory in a "protracted" nuclear war. [Ref. 69]
Although the new Trident I missile is still not a meaningful
counterforce weapon (capable of destroying hardened missile
silos), it nevertheless could contribute significantly to
accurate targeting of command centers which might be less
hardened to overpressure than ICBM silos. Multiple warheads
and great range give new SLBMs the ability to saturate targets
at times of the National Command Authority's choosing. [Ref.
29: p. 6]
K. CONCLUSION
The most lauded feature of SLBMs remains their survivability
in a second strike deterrence strategy. Increased capabilities
through the years have multiplied the options available to
national leadership as to the nature of that second strike.
Never publicly seeking a first strike counterforce capability
for any strategic systems, the U.S. administrations have
continually relied upon the least vulnerable leg of the




VI. THE SSB AND SSBN IN SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
A. INTRODUCTION
It is not possible to trace the development of Soviet
strategic thought through a succession of administrations as
in the case of the United States. Leonid Brezhnev, either
alone, or together with Alexei Kosygen in the early years,
was the acknowledged first among equals of the Soviet Polit-
buro members from October 196 4 to November 19 82. He assumed
power three years before the appearance of the Yankee class
submarine. Therefore, doctrine which governs the employment
of Soviet SSBNs is based on the policies of a single govern-
ment or regime, although those policies reflect lessons
learned and premises set forth by previous political leaders.
Theories and objectives which Brezhnev inherited from
his predecessors are first traced to establish a baseline of
Soviet concerns for national security and means to ameliorate
threats. Doctrinal evolution is then brought forward to
present day, including specifics on ballistic missile sub-
marines. As with U.S. strategic doctrine, Soviet policies
of FBM force levels, technology and targeting and operational
assignment are addressed.
B. SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
1. Definition
Identification of Soviet strategic or nuclear doctrine
as opposed to conventional defense doctrine is difficult
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because the Soviets do not emphasize a distinction between
the two capabilities. Although nuclear weapons are recognized
to have greatly increased destructive potential over con-
ventional arms, they are viewed as an advance in weaponry on
a continuum with other weapons and not as a separate categor-
ized set of military options. Rather, the operative term
which the Soviets apply to the collective plans and procedures
governing the employment of all arms, including SSBNs, is
"military doctrine." [Ref. 70: p. 2]
2 . Development of Modern Nuclear Doctrine
After Joseph Stalin's death in 19 53, the Soviet
political and military leadership began to assess the viability
of the deceased dictator's views of military power. His
emphasis on mass and quantity of conventional arms was being
rapidly overtaken by newer technologies, including thermo-
nuclear weapons and revolutionary delivery vehicles. In
1959, Khrushchev and his advisors reached a major decision
regarding strategy and war which he outlined in a speech to
the Supreme Soviet in January 1960. He noted that nuclear
weapons and long range delivery vehicles had revolutionized
the art of warfare and announced that "our Armed Forces have
to a considerable degree been switched to the nuclear rocket
weapon." In summarizing he outlined the basic elements
which would have a major impact on future military thought
and doctrine. He stated that, because of the huge destructive
power of nuclear weapons, war with the United States was no
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longer inevitable. If war were to come, it would not be
initiated with the crossing of frontiers, but with "rocket
strikes deep in the interior." Therefore, the Soviet Union,
he said, must prepare for war by possessing the means to
survive a surprise attack by the United States, retaliate
with massive force and survive with superior residual power.
Khrushchev boasted that Soviet rockets were superior to those
of the Americans and that they must retain that edge until
a bilateral disarmament could be negotiated with the enemy.
Finally, he announced that the potential and flexibility of
nuclear weaponry precluded the need for large conventional
forces. [Ref. 71: pp. 41-42]
The backbone of Khrushchev's strategy was the newly
formed Strategic Rocket Forces. His stated emphasis on
superiority and nuclear weapons reflected the reality of
American strategic superiority and the ardent desire to
narrow the gap. As Soviet inferiority diminished, doctrine
evolved to encompass more diverse and potent nuclear
capabilities.
James McConnell states that since 1960, Soviet efforts
in development of "new independent options" in military capa-
bilities, and doctrinal innovations which coincide with new
capabilities, have appeared every five years, and are con-
sistent with Party announced five year plans. Each set of
options has refined nuclear planning and capabilities.
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The Soviets initiated long range nuclear planning at
the top of the escalation ladder with total force nuclear
response. Since then, doctrinal and capabilities development
has been refined to allow more limited options. McConnell's
hypothesis traces such development through stages of a single
nuclear option (1960-65), conventional war fighting capability
(1966-70), limited intercontinental strategic options (1971-
75), and theater nuclear forces (1976-80). [Ref. 70: pp. 3-6]
Although Soviet doctrine evolved to reflect increasing
capabilities and flexibility, a number of strategic objectives
and priorities remained unchanged. These constants are basic
to an understanding of Soviet strategic doctrine, especially
in the post-Khrushchev years.
3. Basic Elements of Doctrine
The core of Soviet war-fighting doctrine is to limit
damage to the homeland. This fundamental goal leads to a
counterforce targeting plan (rather than one of assured
destruction) to eliminate the enemy's ability to strike, and
a damage limiting policy for active and passive defenses.
Soviet plans provide for two sets of objectives.
First, there must be the capability to destroy the enemy's
forces in being, his system's war-making potential and his
structure of government and social control. Second, there
must be the ability to protect the physical structure of
the Soviet government and to secure its capacity for
effective operation throughout the state, to ensure survival
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of a certain portion of the working population and industrial
base, and to secure an alternate economic base which can
contribute to rebuilding society. [Ref. 42: p. 142]
These strategic objectives translate into four types
of military conflict preparedness: offensive strike into
enemy territory; offensive and defensive action in theater
or frontal war; homeland defense by the PVO strany or National
Air Defense, and offensive and defensive action in sea and
ocean theaters. [Ref. 20: p. 2] To achieve victory, stra-
tegic action emphasizes four important tactical elements:
surprise, speed, joint action by all forces, and attack with
a maximum combination of the previous three. [Ref. 33: p. 136]
The peace-time functions of military forces also
reflect Soviet priorities of defense and homeland protection.
The term "deterrence" is operative, but its achievement is
conceptualized in a manner sharply contrasting with the
American understanding of the term. Deterrence is achieved
through the ability to fight and win a war should it fail.
"Assured Destruction" is deemed irrational and is soundly
rejected as undermining preparations to conduct a war-
winning strategy. [Ref. 72: pp. 457-458]
The contribution of the Soviet FBM forces to doctrinal
objectives will be discussed following a review of submarine
and missile force levels and technology.
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C. SSB AND SSBN FORCE LEVELS
Conditions in the Soviet Union in the mid-19 50s were
conducive to the initiation of a new strategic program such
as submarine launched ballistic missiles. Nikita Khrushchev
was consolidating his power. His new direction for Soviet
armed forces, with emphasis on nuclear and rocket technology
at the expense of conventional arms , was supported by the
Twentieth Party Congress in 19 56. Admiral Gorshkov's own
ambitions for the VMF, as an ocean-going navy assigned
offensive strategic missions with submarines and aircraft at
the core, reflected the plans of the Communist Party's
Central Committee for Soviet naval development. The VMF
would share in the effort to redress American strategic
superiority. [Ref. 35: pp. 38-40; Ref. 73: p. C-12 By I960,
however, when the Strategic Rocket Force received overwhelming
support for the strategic mission, the VMF had put to sea only
four ballistic missile submarines.
Nevertheless, program and construction inertia sustained
the FBM build-up through the next several years, including
development of the Yankee SSBN.
When a major arms build-up commenced around 1964, an
already vigorous construction program was further accelerated.
By 1970, the VMF had ten Yankees operational and were building
six to eight a year, a rate which would surpass U.S. force
levels by mid-decade. [Ref. 74: p. 10]
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In just six years, thirty- four Yankees in all were
completed. [Ref. 35: p. 43] Benjamin Lambeth of the Rand
Corporation notes the "remarkable quiescence" and even "amity"
in Party and military relations since 196 7. [Ref. 75]
Leaders of both factions were in agreement as to the necessity
and benefit of the massive strategic programs.
When SALT negotiations began in Helsinki in the fall of
1969, the United States had about a three to one numerical
advantage in SLBM launchers. [Ref. 39: pp. 199-200] The
Interim Agreement, signed in May 19 72, froze ICBM and SLBM
levels at those existent and under construction. However,
SLBM launchers could replace older land or sea-based systems.
The Protocol to the Interim Agreement set the numerical
ceilings of 62 submarines and 950 SLBMs for the Soviet Union,
an institutionally approved superiority over American force
levels, held to 44 boats and 710 SLBMs. The generous ceiling
agreed upon for the Soviet FBM fleet did not affect actual
construction and force levels until 19 78. Although Delta
submarines were joining the fleet at a rapid pace, force
levels remained under the ceiling because of agreed upon
exclusion of some older systems from the totals.
The Soviets took full advantage of the strategic agree-
ments, striving 'legally' for superiority. In essence, SALT
I had no effect on SLBM force levels or other systems. The
U.S.S.R. numerically surpassed the United States in ICBMs
in 19 70, in total ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) in
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1971, and in total SLBMs in 1976, {Ref. 72: p. 458J The
doctrinal goal of superiority, stipulated by Khrushchev in
1959, was institutionally sanctioned by arms limitations
talks.
Two thirds of Soviet nuclear submarine construction in
the 1970s was in SSBNs. [Ref. 35: p. 93] Replacement of
Yankees with Deltas has levelled total counted forces at
approximate SALT I limits. The unratified SALT II limits of
1320 delivery vehicles and 1200 MIRVed missiles will not
affect current limits in the foreseeable future. The Soviets
can concentrate on technological advances in their FBM force
while enjoying a bilaterally agreed numerical superiority
over the United States.
D. TECHNOLOGY
The rapid Soviet preparation for all-out nuclear war of
the early 1960s included deployment of the large warhead
SARK and SERB missiles. Their limited capabilities and great
destructive power reflect a characteristically Soviet
emphasis on mass and force vice precision and sophistication.
The technological shortcomings and difficulties of Hotel,
and operational limitations associated with diesel sub-
marines inherent in Golf, inhibited the threat of those
systems to the North American continent. Rather, their




It was not until 1967, with the introduction of the
Yankee-Sawfly combination to the fleet, that Soviet FBM
technology achieved a true intercontinental reach. Warheads
continued to be large, but they now threatened U.S. military
targets.
The SS-N-8 aboard Delta contributed to more limited
strategic options adopted in the early 1970s such as with-
holding or reserve forces for intra-war deterrence. Long
range missiles and quieter more capable submarines enabled
more confidence of survivability in a nuclear exchange.
As emphasis shifted to theater warfare in the late 1970s,
the Soviets derived continued missions for older systems.
Golfs and Hotels may be assigned specific scenario and
theater dependent roles such as support of amphibious oper-
ations in the Baltic or deterrence against meager nuclear
forces of the Peoples Republic of China.
At the intercontinental strategic level, the recently
deployed SS-N-18 allows multiple strike and targeting options
via MIRV warhead technology. [Ref. 76: p. 89] The intro-
duction of multiple independently targeted warheads to the
fleet increases the potential of an FBM strike geometrically.
The Soviet Union has displayed a determination to attain
the highest technology possible to increase strategic capa-
bilities. However, they have just as consistently relied
upon mass, numbers and power, as a hedge against technological
failures. Their flexibility in nuclear options has been
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attained through numbers of launchers and high yield vice
numbers and accuracy of warheads.
Development of the MIRV capability was not hindered by
arms negotiations. SALT I did not address the technology
when Soviet inferiority was most distinct. SALT II, also,
does not curtail significantly a concerted effort to deploy
multiple warheads. MIRVed warheads, the one area in which
the United States enjoys a strategic advantage, has been a
relative newcomer to Soviet capabilities. Either competing
priorities or slow technological advance have hindered
significant exploitation of this important capability in
SLBMs.
Through numerical and technological development
respectively, the Soviet Union has consistently improved
its strategic posture. The Soviets have steadily improved
capabilities in flexible response as well as general war
fighting plans. The innovative characteristics of the
Typhoon SSBN prove continued dedication to increased military
power through technological advances.
General doctrine, force levels and technology are
manifested in Soviet utilization of their FBM force in war
fighting plans. Thus, potential targets for SLBMs and
operational fleet assignments reflect military and political
priorities of the Kremlin leadership.
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E. TARGETING AND OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT
1. Introduction
It is difficult to separate strategy which governs
the employment of naval units, including SSBs and SSBNs , from
from overall strategy as dictated by politics and preparation
for fighting war. [Ref. 33: p. 19] Seaborne units are
considered contributing factors in a combined arms effort,
an integration of all forces, in "defense in depth" of the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 35: pp. 88-89]
Soviet strategy is characteristically land-oriented
with layers or rings of defense emanating from a core
centered at Moscow. Defensive preparation is more intense
toward the center and protection of the homeland is the




Naval units, forced by geographic realities, have
always been positioned in or near the outer rings of the
defensive zones and, therefore, have assumed subsidiary
roles to the land forces in strategic planning. [Ref. 73:
pp. C-10-16] However, as the Soviets have gained military
and political power since World War II, and have attained
a global reach in interests, the VMF has increased in
importance to the Kremlin leadership.
Admiral Gorshkov has repeatedly stated that SSBNs
are the primary striking arm of the VMF and the main reason
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for his service's importance. {Ref. 73; p. C-15J The SSBNs
have thus been assigned three objectives: They have responded
in kind to the American Polaris/Poseidon force, equalizing
a potentially unfavorable shift in the correlation of forces.
[Ref. 23: p. 27] Second, they contribute to the defense of
the Soviet Union as "...an indispensible part of the strategic
nuclear shield of the motherland." [Ref. 35: p. 73] This
objective involves both strategic deterrence and theater
level war fighting. Third, SSBNs are of eminent importance
to the Soviet Union because of their ability to conduct
strategic strikes on the North American continent.
Gorshkov has tied the prestige of the VMF to its
ability to threaten land targets, the so-called "Fleet
Against the Shore" mission. In Sea Power of the State , he
asserts
:
Since the goals of war have been achieved primarily by
occupying enemy territory, successful naval operations
against the shore have brought greater results than
fleet-against-fleet operations. [Ref. 16: pp. 213-
222]
Further, he feels that nuclear weapons have rendered
operations against enemy fleets secondary in any defense
strategy. Thus, Gorshkov articulates a strong advocacy of
a strategic strike mission for his SSBN force. The SLBMs
give the VMF a powerful offensive capability and put the




Gorshkov's strategic strike role for Soviet SSBNs
is not undisputed among military leaders. Detractors have
noted that strategic strike is the primary mission of the
SRF but not of the VMF. SLBM's, it is conjectured, would
only be needed as a back-up to ICBMs for targets particularly
difficult to strike. [Ref. 77: p. 76] According to Robert
Herrick [Ref. 78: p. vj , Soviet SSBN's do not have a share
in deep strike against the continental United States , at
least in a first strike scenario. Their assigned targets
on the enemy mainland have been limited to coastal naval-
oriented installations.
Although forward Yankee patrols gave the VMF an
intercontinental reach, their missiles' targeting was limited
3
to time-urgent counterforce shoreline elements such as C
structures, early warning systems and SSBN bases. [Ref. 9,
1974-75: p. 536; Ref. 35: p. 73] The Deltas, which intro-
duced true intercontinental strike capability to the SLBM
force and motivated Gorshkov's argument for fleet against
shore vice fleet against fleet, still have not secured a
deep strike role for Soviet SSBNs. [Ref. 35: p. 395; Ref.
78: p. ix]
Table VII summarizes Soviet SSBN assignment to the
strategic strike mission according to Robert Herrick. As
indicated, continental targeting is limited to coastal
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Soviet military writers recognize a potential state
of war in which particular residual forces surviving a
prolonged conflict could favorably influence a negotiated
peace. [Ref. 35: p. 10]
Military elements surviving initial exchanges in a
protracted war could actually help to establish the ultimate
winner. These "second echelon forces" would be withheld to
act as an intra-war deterrent threat to the enemy, or to
control territory that cannot be physically occupied through
threat of further belligerence. The Soviets refer to air-
craft carriers and SSBNs as fulfilling this role for the
United States. Evidence suggests that Soviet SSBNs are
intended for similar employment.
From the Soviet point of view, a ballistic missile
submarine's invulnerability or survivability enables its
missiles to be withheld from an initial nuclear exchange
for use in subsequent stages of warfare, or as a decisive
force in negotiating a peace favorable to the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 42: p. 144; Ref. 35: p. 397] According to Robert
Herrick [Ref. 79: p. vi] the withholding role has been
operative for the VMF since 1961. This would imply that
even the earliest Soviet SLBMs were subject to withholding
at some time. Ballistic missile submarines patrolling in
contiguous waters could contribute to implementation of
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of such a role. Conversely, however, it is assumed that
Yankees in forward station may be exempt from the protracted
withholding role because of their position and vulnerability.
Recent military exercises provide evidence of stra-
tegies which withhold SLBM assets. [Ref. 21: p. 77] The
exercises include various phases of conflict from crisis,
through conventional and theater nuclear stages to inter-
continental exchange. Recognition of limited escalating
conflict implies requirement for stratified response to any
level or contingency.
Further evidence of a survivable withholding role
for Soviet SSBNs is their considerable investment in main-
taining safe havens for the boats to operate. Protection
is provided in adjacent waters, secure from U.S. ASW and
in transit or patrol areas with large mobile ASW assets.
[Ref. 35: p. 84] Maintaining these bastions for SSBNs has
been an official VMF mission since as early as 1960. [Ref.
80: p. iv]
The "pro-SSBN" forces must perform two missions.
Until the missiles are fired, the boats must be kept secure
from attack. If the submarines are deployed, they must be
supported with surface and ASW protection. [Ref. 15: p. 149]
Among the multiple units assigned to secure areas of SSBN
operations are ASW cruisers such as MOSKVA, KRESTA II and
KARA; attack submarines and ASW aircraft such as the BEAR F
and IL- 38 MAY. According to Michael MccGwire the most
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recent Soviet ship construction is designed to thwart U.S.
task forces from entering the SSBN patrol areas. BAL-COM II
cruisers, KIROV command ships and the KIEV CV are designed
to survive attack and remain on station continuously in
the SSBN protection mission. [Ref. 81]
4. Regional Warfare and Homeland Maritime Defense
The VMF positions its defensive power including SSBs
and SSBNs to increase the security of the four primary mari-
time approaches to the Soviet Union: to the north in the
Norwegian Sea; to the east in the Baltic; to the south in
the Black Sea; and in the Pacific through Tsushima and La
Perouse Straits to the Sea of Japan. [Ref. 73: p. C-21]
Diesel powered SSBs have been assigned primary
targets on the Eurasian land mass because the Soviets recog-
nize a potential need to deal with the PRC in the event of
war with NATO or the United States. [Ref. 82: p. 10] Units
in the Baltic Sea are assigned tactical targets in support
of theater operations. It is also likely that Yankees could
be assigned such a role when superseded by Deltas in
intercontinental targeting. [Ref. 35: p. 94]
There is some technical evidence to suggest an
additional role for some Soviet SSBNs. Certain character-
istics of the Yankee weapons system indicate possible
targeting of maritime threats, specifically CV battle groups
[Ref. 78: p. vi] The patrol patterns of Yankee class SSBNs
often bring them within range of U.S. task force transit
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lanes, particularly near American home ports. [Ref. 83: p.
154] The unsuccessful SS-NX-13 missile designed for launch
from Yankees had a short-range (about 500 nautical miles)
and a radar guided terminal-homer warhead, suggesting a
tactical marine target. The speed of Yankees is also attri-
buted to anti-carrier warfare and the requirement to keep
pace with a battle group. [Ref. 84: p. 64; Ref. 35: p. 81]
5. Counterforce Ambitions
The Soviets recognize advantages afforded by SLBMs
in counterforce targeting. Shorter flight time enabled by
forward patrols increases the probability of destroying
time-urgent targets such as missile command posts and anti-
missile-defenses. [Ref. 77: p. 77] Typhoon's under-ice
patrol capabilities could contribute to a counterforce role.
[Ref. 20: p. 1] Although some SLBMs may be assigned first
strike roles against military-industrial targets, to date
they lack the requisite accuracy to knock out hardened sites
such as silos and command posts.
F. CONCLUSION
Soviet SLBM targeting and operational assignment reflect
VMF priorities of homeland defense and maritime warfare.
Flexibility is attained through characteristically Soviet
reliance on mass and redundancy. That flexibility, nowever,
is tempered by centralized control and integration of naval
forces into combined arms plans. The mission strongly
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advocated by Admiral Gorshkov for his SSBNs, that of deep
strategic strike, has, thus far, eluded him, the victim of
inter-service rivalry. Rather, SLBMs are most often con-
sidered a naval asset to solve naval military problems.
Their most attractive characteristic, survivability, provides
the SSBNs with their only role which transcends maritime
concerns, that of a potential intra-war deterrent.
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VII. FUTURE POTENTIALS OF SLBMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Both technological and political-diplomatic developments
will shape the nature of future U.S. and Soviet submarine-
based ballistic missile forces. Technology in both nations
is approaching a true counter force targeting capability for
SLBMs. Arms limitations and reduction negotiations may
impair or prevent their attainment of such a capability.
B. COUNTERFORCE
The technologies required for a true counterforce missile
which can destroy a hardened site such as an ICBM silo are
beyond the scope of this paper. The functional realities
of this requirement are: 1) direct hit accuracies within
the blast radius of the warhead; 2) adequate destructive
force to blanket the CEP of the warhead and overcome silo
protection and hardening against overpressures created by
the blast; and, 3) the ability to penetrate ballistic missile
defenses.
1. U.S. Counterforce and Doctrine
The American counterforce SLBM under consideration
is the Trident II D-5 missile, scheduled for full scale
engineering development to begin in FY 19 84 and attainment
of initial operating capability (IOC) by December 19 89.
[Ref. 68: p. 111-59] The D-5 will be 42 feet long and weigh
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6 3 tons, nearly twice the weight of any of its predecessors.
The launchers of the Ohio class SSBNs are designed to
accommodate the D-5.
Specific performance of the missile is highly
classified. The Trident II is expected to have a range of
about 6000 nautical miles. The final stage will be MIRVed
with possibly seven 335 kiloton or fourteen 100 kiloton war-
heads, with a C.E.P. of around 400 feet. [Ref. 59: p. 167]
It is assumed that the missile will also incorporate electronic
and mechanical decoys and jamming devices to suppress defenses.
[Ref. 4, 1972-73: p. 409]
The implications of D-5 are complex because of its
impressive capabilities. Admiral P.F. Carter, Director,
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division of the Office
of Chief of Naval Operations, has emphasized the missile's
flexibility. D-5's soft target capability is increased over
previous SLBMs because of a greater payload. [Ref. 29:
pp. 4-5] Its survivability, based on the quietness and
endurance of the Ohio SSBN, enhances its value as an extended
or withheld deterrent in global or theater strategies. [Ref.
85: p. 74]
The D-5's accuracy and warhead yield also give it
the ability to threaten IC3M silos and other hardened targets.
Detractors of the weapon state that the silo destruction
potential implies an intended first strike use, to strike
ICBMs before launch. A first strike force impels the Soviets to
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preempt with their offensive forces, thus destabilizing the
nuclear balance. Herbert Scoville, President of the Arms
Control Association and former Deputy Director of the C.I. A.,
has called Trident II "a serious arms control problem" and
"basically a mistake." U.S. Congressman Thomas J. Downey,
a member of the House Budget Committee study group on defense
said: "Trident 2 will be the most destablizing first-strike
weapon ever built." [Ref. 10]
Supporters of D-5 cite the weapon's advantages in a
counterforce second strike. The system's invulnerability
eliminates any potential impulse to launch pre-emptively to
avoid destruction, the so-called "use or lose" problem. The
missile's flexibility allows controlled and selective re-
sponses to any Soviet generated contingency. [Ref. 85: p. 74]
Joel S. Wit has described D-5 as an "attractive strategic
option." Responding to critics who cite the missile's
destablizing effects, he retorts that all U.S. advances in
strategic arms, including MX, cruise missiles and Pershing
2, drive the Soviets to pre-empt. [Ref. 10]
The Reagan administration has indicated continued
support for D-5 development. The Improved Accuracy Program
for Poseidon has been curtailed in favor of more intensive
efforts in the new missile. [Ref. 68]
Ultimate force levels of Trident I and Trident II
equipped SSBNs depend upon a number of factors. The great
cost of the programs will be among the most important
102

considerations. The FY 19 8 3 Budget applies roughly 8% of
the Navy's resources to strategic systems. That figure
must increase with continued construction of SSBNs. [Ref.
86: pp. 18-19]
Maintaining a warhead strength of around 400 war-
heads would require fifteen to twenty Ohio class SSBNs. (10
warheads per missile, 24 missiles per submarine). Current
and planned support facilities at Bangor and Kings Bay
indicate a total force of twenty boats. Other speculations
produce additional figures.
2. Soviet Counterforce and Doctrine
Unique physical characteristics of the Typhoon class
SSBN indicate potential counterforce targeting assignment.
Its ability to break through the Arctic ice pack and launch
its missiles from a position close to the United States
enhances the submarine's capability to strike a time-urgent
target such as an ICBM silo. The one Typhoon completed is
now undergoing sea trials and operational status is expected
by mid-decade.
The missile under development to be launched from
Typhoon is the solid fuel SS-NX-20. Larger than the SS-N-18,
the new SLBM is projected to have a range of 4500 to 5000
nautical miles. Its terminal stage will be MIRVed with about
twelve warheads and could complete the counterforce potential




Since counterforce strikes are an integral facet of
Soviet strategic doctrine, a counterforce SLBM would enhance
but not revolutionize Kremlin plans. It might, however,
improve the prestige and importance of the VMF in military
strategy, achieving the deep strike assignment that Gorshkov
covets for his service.
Those men who succeed Leonid Brezhnev in Party and
state leadership are not likely to implement any quick or
major changes in Soviet doctrine. Strategic goals of nuclear
stalemate with the United States by increased numbers and
quality of weapons and expansion and projection of interests
into the Third World are likely to remain operative and stable
into the next decade. [Ref. 73: p. C-50; Ref. 87: p. 477]
Since the Soviets are apparently behind the United States in
SLBM counterforce capability, they will likely attempt to
maintain parity in this area through negotiation.
C. ARMS NEGOTIATIONS
Current superpower arms negotiations which concern SLBM
systems are the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva,
Switzerland which began in July 19 82. SALT I has expired
but both the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed
to abide by the limitations of those talks and the unratified
SALT II accords. The Soviets appear to be holding their
operational systems to rough SALT I limits. No currently
completed negotiations actually affect U.S. production and
development. Other factors discussed in Chapter V have held
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American SLBM forces at lower levels to date. It appears
that slow technological development in the case of the Soviet
Union and alternate systems priorities in the United States
have kept MIRVed warheads below the fourteen re-entry vehicle
limit of SALT II. [Ref. 88]
President Reagan is reported to be seeking a fifteen to
fifty per cent reduction in strategic firepower in START
negotiations. He intends to bypass limits in launching
systems in favor of controlling the numbers of warheads, in
which the United States maintains a lead, and throw weight,
in which the Soviets have superiority. [Ref. 89] Reagan
does not intend to sacrifice the MX ICBM, B-l bomber or the
Trident II missile in the negotiations. [Ref. 90]
The Soviet Union has made a public counterproposal which
would cut Soviet and American missile and bomber forces.
Included are recommendations to curb new SSBN production by
both nations and a ban on cruise missiles and D-5 without
concessions or their part. [Ref. 91]
D. CONCLUSION
U.S. SLBM capabilities in the future seem more assured
than in the Soviet Union. It is certain that if D-5 is
negotiated away, it should cost the Soviets a considerable
strategic capability in turn. A survivable counterforce
FBM fleet would be a significant military asset to either





The concept of submarine-based ballistic missiles has
produced two sometimes congruent and sometimes divergent tracks
of weapon system and strategic doctrine development in the
United States and Soviet Union. Several conclusions can be
drawn from the similarities and contrasts of each nation's
technology, operational policies and nuclear doctrine to
assess effectiveness of the FBM forces in pursuit of national
security and future roles those forces might assume in inter-
national relations.
B. WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY
1. Submarines
From the outset of the FBM program, the United States
has sought the highest quality and state of the art tech-
nology for the Navy's SSBNs. The nation's best efforts in
shipbuilding, electronics and power plants have been in-
corporated into the single system, producing a high quality
platform. All U.S. deterrent submarines are nuclear powered,
enabling a quiet boat, virtually undetectable acoustically,
with long endurance and total independence of operation on
patrol. Their best defense is their silence and stealth.
For twenty-two years, the U.S. FBM force consisted
of only four classes of boats, all with sixteen launch tubes.
10 6

The latest SSBN, the Ohio, although incorporating the latest
advances in computer technology, quieting and habitability
as well as increasing the launchers to twenty- four, never-
theless exhibits many of the design characteristics of the
previous classes. Ohio reflects the consistent trends of
larger, more capable boats that each successive class has
brought.
Although putting an operational ballistic missile
submarine to sea two years before the United States, the
VMF's early systems were far behind their American counter-
parts in technology and capability. The Zulu V's, Golfs and
Hotels all carried very few missiles. The power plants of
all three are inadequate for a strategic mission. Diesel
power on Zulu V and Golf required frequent snorkling, negating
any possibility of long term stealth. Hotel's nuclear plant
was so inadequate, it too never presented a credible threat
to North America.
It was not until Yankee put to sea in 196 7 that the
VMF effectively answered the U.S. FBM challenge. Very similar
in design and capability of the early American SSBNs , the
Yankees were first in presenting a real maritime strategic
threat to the United States.
While American SSBN production stagnated in the late
1960's, the Soviet Union began construction of a third gen-
eration fleet, the Delta series SSBNs, which have brought the
VMF superiority in numbers of boats and launchers since the
107

mid-19 70' s. Larger and quieter than previous classes, the
Deltas approach or surpass previous U.S. capabilities and
technology.
Typhoon, in contrast to Ohio, represents a departure
from previous Soviet SSBN design practices. Its immense
size, the incorporation of two reactors and the missile
section forward of the sail, revolutionize submarine con-
struction. The real meaning of Typhoon's radical design is
not known, but it displays a Soviet willingness to innovate
and attempt new approaches to pace or surpass U.S. capa-
bilities in SSBNs.
Although producing several classes and many modi-
fications in their ballistic missile submarine program, the
Soviets have maintained some consistencies. Like the United
States, the SSBNs have increased in size and capability over
predecessors. They are generally noisier than American
boats with more powerful main plants. For instance, the
reactor of Ohio, the second largest in the Navy's entire
inventory, produces 6 0,000 shaft horsepower as opposed to
the 120,00 total SHP of Typhoon. These powerful and noisy
plants appear to reflect less dedication, on the part of the
Soviets, to stealth as the foremost criterion for weapon
system capability.
2. Missiles
Comparison of U.S. and Soviet missiles mirrors many
of the particular SSBN characteristics of each FBM force.
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The Polaris missile had a limited range and crude
accuracy. However, the size of its warhead and the mobility
of its launch platform made Polaris a formidable weapon from
the outset. The SSBN's ability to patrol undetected in the
Arctic and Mediterranean brought the one megaton warheads to
bear on Soviet cities from 1960 on.
However, the early Soviet SLBM's, the SS-N-4 and
SS-N-5, although lifting a powerful warhead, were precluded
from posing a serious intercontinental threat by short range
and inadequate platforms. Again, not until 196 7, with intro-
duction of the 1600 nautical mile SS-N-6 , the Soviets first
attained a comparable FBM threat to the United States.
While numbers of SSBNs stagnated in the U.S. Navy,
the FBM force geometrically increased its total warheads by
conversion to the MIRV Poseidon on thirty-one boats. Since
its introduction to the fleet in 19 71, Poseidon has enabled
a total warhead complement of over 4000 independently targeted
vehicles. The Soviet Union, although surpassing the United
States in numbers of subs and launchers, did not respond in
kind with its own MIRV until 19 78 with the SS-N-18. Total
Soviet SLBM warheads remain roughly a third in number of
their counterparts.
The U.S. Trident I C-4 brings an increase in accuracy
and some range over Poseidon. However, it must be considered
an interim weapon, without the great impact and step level
increase in capability that Polaris, Poseidon and D-5 represent,
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Since the introduction of the SS-N-8 to the VMF in
19 72, Soviet SLBMs have retained superior range and mega-
tonnage to U.S. missiles. With operational ranges in excess
of 4000 nautical miles, the SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 threaten U.S.
targets from Soviet home waters. Generally, American MIRVed
missiles have light (50KT) warheads and ranges which enable
extensive operational patrol areas.
The U.S. Navy abandoned the volatile and complex
liquid fuel missile engines early in the FBM program. All
U.S. SLEMs are solid fuel, requiring less maintenance and
preparation for launch.
With the exception of the SS-N-17 deployed on a
single Yankee and the experimental SS-NX-20 , the Soviets
have relied upon liquid fuel engines for their SLBMs. Based
on the American experience with liquid fuel, the VMF ' s ability
to maintain readiness in its missiles must be problematic.
3. Summary
In summary, while U.S. technology remains superior
to the Soviets in SSBN stealth and warhead numbers and
accuracy, the Soviets have effectively compensated with large
numbers of quite capable submarines and powerful missiles.
While the United States held an unquestionable lead in FBM
forces from 1960 until the mid 19 70s, the Delta fleet
equipped with long range missiles has narrowed U.S. strategic
superiority to numbers of SLBM warheads only. The VMF,
through different SSBN deployment practices summarized in
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following sections, has effectively negated any disadvantage
incurred from noisy power plants.
C. OPERATIONS
1. Personnel
The personnel assigned to SSBNs in the U.S. Navy and
the VMF are highly trained, part of an elite force within the
services. In the United States, the submariners cross-qualify
in many skills and positions aboard the boats. Soviet officers
and senior enlisted men endure long sea assignments , often
in the same submarines for years. The VMF also assigns con-
scripts to their SSBNs. It is assumed that their duties are
extremely limited; at best, exposing the young sailors to
the rigors of submarine life and preparing them for subsequent
skilled billets as warrant officers.
2. Basing and Support
The Polaris missile's range necessitated forward
basing and support for the U.S. FBM force. Any similar sup-
port received by Yankees on station off the North American
coastlines is a matter of conjecture.
However, for both nations, the longer ranges of
second and third generation SLBMs have precluded most of the
requirements for remote or forward support. The trend for
the United States has been to pull back home ports and support
facilities to contiguous waters and to base SSBN squadrons
in a handfull of facilities. Similarly, the Soviet Union
concentrates its FBM force in a few major ports.
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The routine and major maintenance requirements for
U.S. SSBNs, it is concluded, must be greater than for Soviet
boats because of their more rigorous patrol schedules. While
American boats are at sea more than half of their operational
life, the tendency is for VMF submarines to spend the majority
of their time pierside. Major overhaul on U.S. SSBNs occurs
about every six years and approximately eight to nine years
on Soviet submarines.
3. Patrols
The U.S. Navy maintains about 50% to 55% of its SSBNs
on patrol at all times. The boats operate independently,
communicating in a receive-only mode with elements of the
National Command Authority.
Soviet SSBNs, for the most part, patrol in limited
areas, strongly defended by supporting surface ships, aircraft
and SSNs. Usually, only 15% or less of the total FBM force
is at sea at any time.
The Yankee forward patrols are an exception to
current operational doctrine. Their patrol stations, far
from contiguous waters, require long transit times necessitating
considerable at-sea periods of virtually independent
operations.
4. Communi cations
The FBM communications networks of both the United
States and Soviet Union are secure and redundant, based on
VLF stations with myriad back-up systems. All SSBNs are
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centrally controlled by the highest command echelons. Their
responsiveness in wartime situations is a continuing challenge
to U.S. and Soviet leadership. Communications, as a vital




The consistently stated objective of U.S. strategic
forces in peacetime is deterrence of a Soviet nuclear strike.
The Soviets are theoretically deterred by the American
capability to respond with a second strike which would de-
stroy Soviet society. Two key elements define U.S. strategy.
First, strategic forces must be able to survive a Soviet
offensive first strike because government leaders have
always denied a U.S. first strike capability. Second,
deterrence is guaranteed by the threat of assured destruction,
a punitive second strike.
The Soviets similarly believe that strategic forces
promote the absence of war between superpowers through deter-
rence. However, to Kremlin theorists, deterrence is achieved
through the capability to win a nuclear war should deterrence
fail. By striving to attain a war-winning posture, at the
very least, the enemy would clearly perceive his own inability
to win a global conflict. Thus, deterrence is successful
because the United States is denied its own war-winning
posture and is threatened by the Soviet capability to do so.
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However, so long as the 'imperialists 1 maintain and build
offensive forces, the Soviet military must also retain the
ability to survive an enemy attack and prevail with superior
offensive arms.
2. War-Fighting
American war-fighting doctrine reflects the efforts
by successive administrations to achieve flexibility and
increased capabilities for a second strike scenario. The
ultimate deterrent of assured destruction is omnipresent but,
as weaponry has grown more sophisticated, precise and
numerous, the nature of a retaliatory second strike has be-
come more pliable and subject to prerogative.
Single-strike massive retaliation was succeeded by
damage limitation defense and counterforce offensive. The
perceived strategic instability of this doctrine and its
great cost led to bilateral assured destruction which was
superseded by limited strategic options and flexible response.
The Carter, Ford and Reagan administrations have all expanded
the role of strategic forces in a flexible response strategy
while consistently espousing a second strike only offensive
force.
Soviet war fighting doctrine is based on the central
priority of defense of the homeland. As military capabilities
have increased, the Kremlin has added additional stones to
the wall around the Soviet Union.
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As a reflection of deterrence theory, the primary
means of achieving homeland security is through offensive
capability. The threat of taking the front of a global war
as far from Moscow as possible ensures its safety. However,
as a hedge against enemy penetration, rings or layers of
defensive forces provide a homeland defense in depth.
Whether the theater of war is distant from or within Soviet
territory, doctrine holds that military forces will be de-
ployed to take advantage of elements of surprise and speed
and through a combined arms approach. Though nuclear weapons
provide much greater destructive potential than conventional
arms, they are one element of a continuum of military war-
fighting options.
3. SLBM Contribution
U.S. SSBNs have been most useful to strategic planners
because of their survivability or invulnerability. Thus,
their missiles are a guarantee of a second strike assured
destruction capability. Essentially lacking the accuracy
for counterforce targeting, they have consistently retained
the assignment of soft urban-industrial areas. Improved
technology has generally been limited to better SSBNs to
enhance stealth and survivability and increased numbers of
warheads on missiles through MIRV to create more flexible
options. As response options have increased, more diverse
roles for SLBMs have been conceived, including an intra-war
deterrent force or strategic war-fighting reserve and the
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NATO theater role. The mission thus far denied SLBMs , that
of counterforce or silo destruction, could have been achieved
as early as 19 72 with improved Poseidon missiles. Inter-
national and domestic politics and not technology have with-
held that capability from the FBM force.
Soviet SLBM targeting, for the most part, has been
limited to maritime objectives, either coastal support and
basing sites or enemy vessels. However, the VMF dedicates
substantial resources to the protection of SSBN operations
"havens" with surface, subsurface and aircraft. Thus, SSBNs
must be a force to be protected during a conflict, possibly
as a reserve strategic strike asset. It is believed that
at least some SLBMs would be withheld from an initial nuclear
strike to act as an intra-war deterrence and influence
superpower negotiations in a way favorable to the Soviet
Union.
Forward-stationed Yankees or any other SSBNs on
remote patrol could also be useful in some counter-military
targeting. A shortened missile flight time enabled by their
proximity to target enhances missile effectiveness against
3time-urgent sites such as bomber bases and C centers.
Some Soviet SSBs and SSBNs are also assigned
specialized theater war-fighting roles in the Baltic and
Pacific in anti-NATO or anti-PRC strikes.
Admiral Gorshkov's desired mission for his SSBN's,
that of a deep strategic strike against U.S. offensive force
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ICBMs, has thus far been denied Soviet SLBMs because of
either bureaucratic prerogatives and preferences for the
SRF in such a role f or inadequate technological development
in warhead accuracy.
4. Force Levels and Technology
The United States 1 most consistent force-level policy
has been that of sufficiency in numbers, relying on superior
technology to keep pace with Soviet strategic forces. Such
policy caused the stagnation of U.S. FBM forces at 41 boats
and 656 launchers for thirteen years.
The Soviets display a consistent trend of building
large and numerous forces, including SSBNs and missiles.
They emphasize technology but hedge against its failure with
numbers and destructive power. It is apparent that modern
Soviet SSBN construction has levelled off recently because
of strategic arms agreements as much as feelings of force
sufficiency for national security.
The United States remains dedicated to high tech-
nology. This results in higher cost systems and hence,
generally fewer numbers. Again, the Soviets place first
priority of any technological breakthroughs in application
to weaponry, but tend more to rely on mass, quantity and
redundancy in forces including FBM's.
5. The Future
With the projected IOC of the Trident D-5 missile,
the United States appears to be on the brink of a true
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counterforce SLBM capability. The future potential of the
Soviet Typhoon and the SS-NX-20 is more problematic. Both
submarine and missile appear to be intended for counterforce
assignment. The future of FBM technology and employment
will be determined by U.S. intentions and resolve and Soviet
advances in capabilities. Either nation's progress in
attaining counterforce SLBMs could be impaired or halted by
domestic politics, international arms negotiations or failure
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